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Series Foreword
“Media determine our situation,” Friedrich Kittler infamously wrote 
in his Introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Although this 
dictum is certainly extreme— and media archaeology has been 
critiqued for being overly dramatic and focused on technological 
developments— it propels us to keep thinking about media as 
setting the terms for which we live, socialize, communicate, orga-
nize, do scholarship, et cetera. After all, as Kittler continued in his 
opening statement almost thirty years ago, our situation, “in spite 
or because” of media, “deserves a description.” What, then, are the 
terms— the limits, the conditions, the periods, the relations, the 
phrases— of media? And, what is the relationship between these 
terms and determination? This book series, In Search of Media, 
answers these questions by investigating the often elliptical “terms 
of media” under which users operate. That is, rather than produce 
a series of explanatory keyword- based texts to describe media 
practices, the goal is to understand the conditions (the “terms”) 
under which media is produced, as well as the ways in which media 
impacts and changes these terms.
Clearly, the rise of search engines has fostered the proliferation 
and predominance of keywords and terms. At the same time, it 
has changed the very nature of keywords, since now any word 
and pattern can become “key.” Even further, it has transformed 
the very process of learning, since search presumes that, (a) with 
the right phrase, any question can be answered and (b) that the 
answers lie within the database. The truth, in other words, is “in 
there.” The impact of search/media on knowledge, however, goes 
viii beyond search engines. Increasingly, disciplines— from sociology to 
economics, from the arts to literature— are in search of media as 
a way to revitalize their methods and objects of study. Our current 
media situation therefore seems to imply a new term, understood 
as temporal shifts of mediatic conditioning. Most broadly, then, this 
series asks: What are the terms or conditions of knowledge itself?
To answer this question, each book features interventions by 
two (or more) authors, whose approach to a term— to begin with: 
communication, pattern discrimination, markets, remain, machine, 
archives— diverge and converge in surprising ways. By pairing up 
scholars from North America and Europe, this series also advances 
media theory by obviating the proverbial “ten year gap” that exists 
across language barriers due to the vagaries of translation and 
local academic customs and in order to provoke new descriptions, 
prescriptions, and hypotheses— to rethink and reimagine what 
media can and must do.
Introduction
Timon Beyes, Lisa Conrad, 
and Reinhold Martin
In search of media, one sooner or later arrives at the question of 
organization. The relation between media and organization is so 
obvious that it borders on the tautological: after all, media organize 
things into patterns and relations. As Cornelia Vismann (2008) 
has shown in her media history Files, these seemingly innocuous 
everyday recording, storing, and circulation apparatuses are at the 
heart of the legal and administrative systems as we know them. 
Their techniques have come to shape the architecture of digital 
machines and data processing, in which we thus find traces of 
more or less bygone administrative practices. Media can therefore 
be understood as “civilizational ordering devices” (Peters 2015, 
5), and if the civilizational encompasses all kinds of sociotechnical 
ordering, then “[media] are fundamental constituents of [any 
form, or any process of] organization” (Peters 2015, 19). It seems 
hard to find a more clear- cut claim to relevance for thinking media 
through organization, and organization through media. But this 
quasi- tautological loop is in need of further scrutiny. It covers up 
a complex field— perhaps a battlefield— of relations that indeed 
constitute matters of great concern. In fact, if media are busy 
ordering social or sociotechnical relations, then they are invested 
with power and domination, control and surveillance, disruption 
and emancipation (Lovink and Rossiter 2018).
This intimate relation of media and organization therefore is 
as old as the hills (Beyes, Holt, and Pias 2019). Yet digital media 
x technologies actualize it and perhaps exacerbate its potentials and 
conflicts. After all, “digital media traffic less in content, programs, 
and opinions than in organization, power, and calculation” (Peters 
2015, 7). They forcefully remind us that “organization is the 
message,” to quote the title of Lisa Conrad’s contribution to this 
book. They enable and call for new “propositions on the organiza-
tional form,” as Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter make clear in their 
afterword to this volume.
If technological media are amenable to, or support, or condition 
different organizational forms, however, then this implies that they 
can let themselves be somewhat formed, or formed in somewhat 
different ways. The relation between media and organization is 
quasi- tautological because it is recursive. Indeed, “media organize,” 
as Reinhold Martin (2003) has concretized the claim that media 
determine our situation (because how could they determine it if 
not through organizing it?) and as his chapter in this book further 
elaborates. In some ways, media determine organization. But at 
the same time, media are organized, and organization in some 
ways determines media. “Organizing media,” to pick up the title of 
Timon Beyes’s contribution to this volume, thus needs to be read 
in its twofold meaning: media technologies condition life through 
their organizational effects (at least in the Western world, to return 
to Vismann [2008, xii, emphasis original], “a life without files, 
without any recording, a life off the record, is simply unthinkable”); 
at the same time, to take place, to disappear or to be transformed, 
media technologies are necessarily predicated on organizational 
constellations (how files have been and are administered— 
processed, circulated, archived— shaped their trajectories as 
media). This recursive loop between media and organization is 
then quasi- tautological because it touches upon the understanding 
of media themselves: as “not only the conditions of possibility for 
events” but “in themselves events: assemblages or constellations 
of certain technologies, fields of knowledge, and social institutions” 
(Horn 2007, 8).
xiThis book is dedicated to this “knot” of media and organization. 
It does not claim to untie this knot, for that would be a grandilo-
quent, impossible project. But it endeavors to disentangle import-
ant threads, both conceptually and empirically (as if the two could 
be held distinct). In this sense, while each of the following texts can 
be read independently from the others, they have been developed 
in joint discussion and are meant to hang together and cohere as a 
joint response to the question of media as/and organization.
In “Media Organize: Persons,” Reinhold Martin shows how such 
“media organizing” takes place through the sociotechnical pro-
cesses of ordering things, knowledge, and people into— discursive, 
institutional, social, political, biological— bodies. Through the figures 
of the person, the machine, and the circle, Martin traces how 
media shape, solidify, and perform corporate bodies, personalizing 
corporate forms and affects and binding people to its causes. In 
“Organizing Media: Security and Entertainment,” Timon Beyes dis-
cusses sculptural works by the artist Simon Denny to coax out their 
performance of different yet entangled modes of— protocological, 
bureaucratic, and entrepreneurial— ordering. These modes shape 
a contemporary organizational nexus of persistent consumer and 
citizen surveillance in the name of security and consumption, the 
“security– entertainment complex.” In “Organization Is the Message: 
Gray Media,” Lisa Conrad takes a closer look at how media research 
can engage with the concept of organization by considering the 
“gray medium” of enterprise resource planning software. Distin-
guishing between media as organizing mechanisms, as themselves 
entangled with and predicated on institutional and organizational 
conditions, and as implicated in the normative question of the 
“good organization,” Conrad seeks to find a more affirmative 
ground on what organization and media can do to each other 
than the comparably dark analyses of Martin and Beyes. In their 
“Afterword: Propositions on the Organizational Form,” Geert Lovink 
and Ned Rossiter resolutely call for experimenting with organi-
zational forms (rather than, we might surmise, merely dwelling 
xii on their oppressive effects). Instead of endorsing or analyzing 
the short- termism and weak ties of social media, the question 
of organization here resurfaces as an activist one of “sovereign 
media,” directed at newly found commitments that are in need of 
more stabilized capacities for decision- making and action.
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Media	Organize:	Persons
Reinhold Martin
Media organize. By this I mean that, as intermediaries among 
persons and between persons and worlds, media construct 
patterns and relationships that pose the question of order. They 
ask us to ask, is there order here? If so, what is its form? What is its 
source? Thus, insofar as persons operate media, media also help to 
organize those persons into active, relational bodies. This circulari-
ty opens the fields of media archaeology and media studies beyond 
their now- classical subject matter— gramophone, film, typewriter, 
their precursors and their descendants— to such an extent that 
we must risk tautology and say that the term “media” itself refers 
to the set of sociotechnical artifacts and processes that organize 
things into patterns and relationships. Sociotechnical rather than 
merely technical, not only to acknowledge the social production of 
technical things but also, and again risking tautology, to acknowl-
edge the technical production of social relations.
This view modifies— but also ratifies— the decontextualized Kittle-
rian aphorism that “media determine our situation” (Kittler 1986). 
For it is not a question of linear, mechanistic determination; rather, 
it is a question of differentiating among degrees of reciprocal 
determination. Expand the term media in this way and you get 
something that more plausibly “determines our situation,” in the 
sense of material processes, such as organization, out of which 
those social relations emerge, and vice versa.
2 “Media organize” is also the thesis of The Organizational Complex 
(Martin 2003), a media history that doubles as a history of corpo-
rate architecture. There I defined the “organizational complex” 
emergent in the post– World War II United States as the aesthetic 
and technological extension of the military– industrial complex and 
mapped its contours at the intersection of architecture, cybernet-
ics, and corporate sociability. The Organizational Complex aimed 
to rearrange the assumptions of my disciplinary home by arguing 
that architecture, understood as one among many media, evinced 
a feedback- oriented, modular, pattern- based “diagram” (in the 
Deleuzian sense, on which I will elaborate below) comparable to, 
but quite different from, Jeremy Bentham’s much earlier panopti-
con. Ultimately, this diagram belonged to the affective “societies 
of control” that Gilles Deleuze argued had, by mid- century, begun 
to displace the disciplinary societies studied by Michel Foucault 
(Deleuze 1995).
Terminology like this is common in “new materialist” thought that 
speaks, as I also do, of Foucaldian dispositifs or apparatuses. In 
a more Deleuzo- Guattarian vein, such thought might contrast 
hierarchical treelike organizational patterns with less hierarchical 
rhizomelike ones. But organization is more than just a question 
of vertically oriented trees versus horizontally oriented rhizomes. 
Nor does it merely entail, to continue in the Deleuzo- Guattarian 
idiom, a sociospatial typology that runs from “smooth” (gaseous 
or fluid) to “striated” (geomorphic or crystalline). To make deeper 
sense of the verb to organize, and to get closer to the “material” 
of materialism by examining critically the premise of a material 
substrate to the social order, I want to return to certain concepts 
that Deleuze and Guattari elaborated by way of two instances of 
what is sometimes called “immaterial production.”1 One of these is 
a precursor to the mid- twentieth- century organizational complex; 
the other is among its descendants.
The first of these instances involves a contribution made by 
the early nineteenth- century residential college to the birth of 
corporate personhood, wherein the corporation becomes an entity 
3capable of eliciting human emotions. The second, which I will 
summarize with a brief literary exposé prefaced by a theoretical 
excursus, derives from the first. It involves the circulation of affect 
as both capital and interpersonal social bond within a neoliberal 
media complex, the diagram for which is less treelike or rhizomatic 
than it is circular. Though separated by two centuries, both of these 
instances refer to persons, whether corporate or individual, as 
organized bodies. In arguing that media organize, then, I am more 
specifically arguing that media organize bodies— discursive bodies, 
institutional bodies, social bodies, political bodies, and biological 
bodies. That is, they bind persons together, inside and out.
Persons
To begin with, recall that when Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(1987, 158) wrote of a “body without organs,” they were quite spe-
cific: “The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to the organization 
of the organs called the organism.” The organism is what happens 
when the body enters the field of power, or what Deleuze and 
Guattari call, after Antonin Artaud, the “judgment of God.” From 
the perspective of the organizational complex, it is not accidental 
that the date of Artaud’s pronouncement “to have done with the 
judgment of God”— November 28, 1947, which titles the relevant 
chapter of A Thousand Plateaus— is exactly coincident with the date, 
November 1947, with which Norbert Wiener (1948, 39) signed the 
introduction to his book Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication 
in the Animal and the Machine, while a visiting faculty member at 
the National Institute of Cardiology in Mexico City. For, as Wiener’s 
institutional affiliation attests, cybernetics is nothing if not devoted 
to recovering the organism as its object of cognition, at the very 
moment that electromechanical technics threatened that object 
with dissolution.
Recall also that in that introduction, Wiener (1948, 18) defined orga-
nization negentropically, as follows: “Just as the amount of informa-
tion in a system is a measure of its degree of organization, so the 
entropy of a system is a measure of its degree of disorganization; 
4 and the one is simply the negative of the other.” Encouraged 
at the Macy Cybernetics Conferences by Gregory Bateson and 
Margaret Mead to extend this principle into the domain of social 
organization, Wiener conceded that “it is certainly true that the 
social system is an organization like the individual, that it is bound 
together by a system of communication, and that it has a dynamics 
in which circular processes of a feedback nature play an important 
part” (24). Still, he argued that available statistical runs pertaining 
to human affairs were insufficiently long and insufficiently constant 
to obtain reliable results. This and other limitations, however, could 
be overcome, or at least overlooked, and within a decade, the 
social sciences had absorbed the cybernetic hypothesis.
Behind this well- known story is a theory of organized social life that 
bears closer scrutiny. In 1947, Wiener indicated his sympathy for 
those like Bateson and Mead who, in “the present age of confu-
sion,” sought a cybernetic social science (Wiener 1948, 33). Several 
years later, he attempted as much himself in his beautifully titled 
ramble The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society 
(Wiener [1950] 1954). To the extent that this later book has a focus, 
it is on the negentropic, homeostatic function of cybernetic feed-
back systems. Among its most lucid passages is a chapter added to 
the second edition devoted to “organization as the message,” which 
observes that
we have already seen that certain organisms, such as 
man, tend for a time to maintain and often even to in-
crease the level of their organization, as a local enclave 
in the general stream of increasing entropy, of increasing 
chaos and de- differentiation. Life is an island here and 
now in a dying world. The process by which we living 
beings resist the general stream of corruption and decay 
is known as homeostasis. (95)
Wiener extrapolates a pattern- based, informational type of ho-
meostasis (“organization as the message”) from a biological one, 
comparing the biochemical maintenance of body temperature 
5with the negative feedback devices of mechanical automata. It is 
not bodily tissue per se but “the pattern [i.e., the organism, in the 
Deleuzo- Guattarian sense] maintained by this homeostasis which is 
the touchstone of our personal identity. . . . We are but whirlpools 
in a river of ever- flowing water. We are not stuff that abides, but 
patterns that perpetuate themselves” (96). Human beings and 
their societies are therefore, according to Wiener, transmissable 
messages borne on an ever- changing material substrate that tends 
toward entropy. The problem in translating cybernetics to the 
social sciences becomes one of converting the science of neuronal 
or electromechanical feedback into one of pattern maintenance 
based on statistical data (and computing capacity) adequate to the 
organizational complexities of large collective bodies conceived as 
homeostatic organisms. But if another name for “pattern” here is 
not just “body” but “subject,” how are such patterns produced and 
maintained at the sociotechnical level, that is, at the level of media 
complexes?
We can almost still hear Artaud shouting in protest against the 
organismic subject whose authority short- circuits the underlying 
libidinal economy circa 1947, quoted by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987, 571):
When you will have made him a body without organs then 
you will have delivered him from all his automatic reac-
tions and restored him to his true freedom.
Deleuze and Guattari’s version of Artaud’s body- without- organs 
(BwO) is hence neither organic nor inorganic but rather, as they 
say, anorganic. That is, the BwO is not exactly a disorganized, 
disorderly, or anarchic body; rather, it is a form of embodied sub-
jectivity that experiments on itself, putting itself at risk to become 
hypochondriac, paranoid, schizo, drugged, or masochist. The the-
orists quote Artaud: “The body is the body. Alone it stands. And in no 
need of organs. Organism it never is. Organisms are the enemy of the 
body” (158, emphasis original). Repeating the title of Artaud’s radio 
play, they add, “The judgment of God, the system of the judgment 
6 of God, the theological system, is precisely the operation of He 
who makes an organism, an organization of organs called the 
organism” (158– 59). Organization and stratification, then, as pri-
mordial violence, the “judgment of God”: “The BwO is that glacial 
reality where the alluvions, sedimentations, coagulations, foldings, 
and recoilings that compose an organism— and also a signification 
and a subject— occur” (159). In short, the BwO is Norbert Wiener’s 
“river of ever- flowing water” from which patterned organisms 
arise.
As “glacial reality,” the BwO is not a medium. Like background 
noise in a communications channel, it is constitutively premedial, 
if by “media” we mean any apparatus that organizes this noise into 
“alluvions, sedimentations, coagulations, foldings, and recoilings.” 
Here I deliberately use the Foucauldian term apparatus (or disposi-
tif) to be more precise about defining media not as communication 
systems but as organizational ones, in order to address from a 
media- theoretical point of view and in a highly attenuated fashion 
the emergence of the modern corporation as a political body— 
that is, as an organized body, a system subject to “the judgment 
of God.”
Among the precursors to the latter- day corporations that would 
consolidate a cybernetic hegemony in the neoliberal world order, 
and especially what is known as the Google– Apple– Facebook– 
Amazon (GAFA) circle, are the research universities that developed 
and circulated the technoscientific knowledge out of and around 
which that hegemony was built. In the United States in particular, 
many of these universities grew out of older residential colleges 
founded under one of several Protestant denominations and there-
fore subject quite directly to “the judgment of God.” As colleges 
became universities, the “Protestant ethic” by which they were 
governed was secularized, or so it is still often said, with the insti-
tutionalization of the scientific method, the authority of number 
and calculability, the rise of vocational training, and the delinking 
of the humanities and the social sciences from the explicitly moral 
program of the church.
7By the 1920s, research universities seemed to be following the 
pattern of “incorporation” established by the great industrial 
concerns— railroads, mining conglomerates, auto manufacturers— 
by becoming multiheaded bureaucracies. The result was the 
abstraction and compartmentalization of knowledge into academic 
departments, specialties, and subspecialties, such that by 1947, 
Norbert Wiener could exclaim of his colleagues, “A man may be 
a topologist or an acoustician or a coleopterist. He will be filled 
with the jargon of his field, and will know all its literature and all 
its ramifications, but, more frequently than not, he will regard the 
next subject as belonging to his colleague three doors down the 
corridor, and will consider any interest in it on his own part as an 
unwarrantable breach of privacy” (Wiener 1948, 8). Hence Wiener 
argued for the interdisciplinary science of cybernetics on the 
basis of its institutional as well as moral necessity, and with these 
(despite his personal misgivings), integration into a sociotechnical 
organism that, by 1970, was renamed the military– industrial– 
academic complex.
What this teleology leaves aside, however, is not only the fact that 
the small denominational colleges were themselves among the na-
tion’s earliest corporations but also the news that, as Deleuze put 
it in 1990, businesses— that is, corporations— had souls (Deleuze 
[1990] 1995, 181). Contrary to the neo- Weberian thesis and closer 
to the premises of the Turing test, where machine intelligence is 
measured by a human being’s inability to distinguish a machine’s 
communications from those of a person, corporations were like 
computing machines precisely to the extent that they acquired 
liberal human attributes, such as rights. These attributes, in turn, 
encouraged humans to regard the corporate body as a special kind 
of person, in a two- way street of subjectification that ultimately 
compels us to ask, what kind of human can love a corporation?
By 1800, in the early American republic, business, educational, and 
religious corporations were regularly formed to enable collective 
action like building roads or establishing cities semi- independently 
from the national state, which was (as now) viewed by many with 
8 suspicion. Hence the decades immediately following U.S. inde-
pendence saw the proliferating incorporation of towns, turnpike 
authorities, bridge companies, religious associations, colleges, 
schools, and many other institutions. During the long nineteenth 
century, these corporations shifted from being conceived under 
the law as mere vehicles for collective activity to being recognized 
as active agents with rights and responsibilities of their own. The 
basis of this agency is what is commonly called the “legal fiction” of 
corporate personhood.2
Corporate personhood gained formal recognition in 1886 when, 
in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that corporations were entitled to equal 
protection under the law as provided to natural persons under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which had been ratified in 1868 largely 
to secure equal treatment for freed slaves. This historical irony 
was reaffirmed when, in 1910, the Court concluded in Southern 
Railway Co. v. Greene, “That a corporation is a person, within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer open to 
discussion.”3 Not long thereafter, in 1926, no less a figure than John 
Dewey theorized “corporate personality” as, essentially, a concrete 
performative. Legal historians have supplied partial explanations 
as to how this came about, but most of these presuppose (contrary 
to Dewey) an ontological distinction between natural and artificial 
persons that is abrogated by force of law and hence construe 
corporate personhood as a species of literary personification.4 This 
is probably because nearly all such accounts are purely discursive, 
giving little sense of how the corporate person was or is materially 
constituted.
The residential college offers early entry into that process through 
the 1819 U.S. Supreme Court case known as Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, in which the Court ruled that privately 
chartered institutions held contract rights comparable to those of 
private persons. Dartmouth College had been incorporated in 1769 
by means of a charter granted by Britain’s King George III, as was 
typical at the time (Maier 1993, 56– 57).5 Although its initial, largely 
9unfulfilled purpose was to Christianize Indigenous youths, the 
precariously founded new college was, like nearly all of its peers, 
actually devoted to the education of white Protestant men. In 
1816, in the aftermath of a conflict between the college’s presi-
dent and trustees, the State of New Hampshire sought to revise 
Dartmouth’s charter to place it under the administrative control of 
state government. The trustees objected, arguing that this violated 
the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prevents the 
state from impairing the “Obligations of Contracts” among private 
individuals or among individuals and the state. The Court found 
that the charter amounted to such a contract and that the actions 
of the state were in violation of this constitutional clause.6
But if the U.S. Supreme Court thereby recognized the already 
incorporated Dartmouth College as bearing the contract rights 
of a private individual, the means by which that recognition was 
secured suggest that it entailed more than just a legal fiction. In 
his closing argument before the Court on behalf of Dartmouth 
College, the orator, attorney, and Dartmouth alumnus Daniel 
Webster exclaimed of his alma mater to the presiding justice, John 
Marshall, that it is “a small college. And yet there are those who love 
it.” At which point Webster reportedly choked up, tears filling his 
eyes (Shewmaker 1990, 168– 69, emphasis original). Strategically 
successful as it was, we can regard Webster’s declaration of filial 
love for his college as genuine, not because its apparent sponta-
neity testified to true feeling rather than calculation, but because, 
as the Court’s decision bore out, the college had already become a 
body capable of eliciting human emotion.
The evidence for this at Dartmouth and the other early colleges is 
abundant but counterintuitive. By the time Daniel Chester French 
installed his sculpture of the goddess Athena on the steps of 
the new Columbia University campus in 1904, refiguring her as 
a proud but nurturing mother, it was unproblematic— expected, 
even— to declare not only loyalty to but love for one’s alma mater. 
In Foucault’s language, this too was discipline. Not only did it 
extrapolate the maternal domestic function, during the Romantic 
10 and early Victorian periods, of training into literacy (what Friedrich 
Kittler mischievously called the “mother’s mouth”), and not only 
did it extend the residential college’s long- standing practice of in 
loco parentis into the whole university system, most importantly, 
it tolerated misbehavior, failure, and even delinquency, asking in 
return— demanding, really— only to be loved.
Remember that, as Foucault emphasizes, delinquency is a product 
of the carceral apparatus rather than its antithesis; failure is 
therefore among that apparatus’s prerequisites for proper func-
tioning. In the sphere of education, a principal instrument for the 
distribution of failure is the examination, the inaugural instance of 
which is the entrance examination. Upon arriving in Hanover, New 
Hampshire, in 1797, the fifteen- year- old Daniel Webster there-
fore had his knowledge of English, Greek, Latin, and arithmetic 
tested before being allowed to enroll at Dartmouth (Remini 1997, 
44). Such on- the- spot exams were common at the time, as was 
delinquent behavior once admitted. At Princeton (then the College 
of New Jersey), for example, Nassau Hall, the main building, which 
dates from the late eighteenth century, had all the trappings of a 
good disciplinary apparatus (Foucault 1995, 141– 54): enclosure, or 
confinement; a system of cellular partitioning; distinctly marked 
“functional sites”; and “ranks,” both within rooms (rows of beds or 
desks) and among them (by year, etc.)— likewise class schedules; 
daily recitations; the teaching of proper handwriting, with proper 
posture; a student– pen– paper– chair– desk interface; and various 
prohibitions on time wasting, etc. More than simply a building, 
then, Nassau Hall was a media complex. As such, it was repeatedly 
the object of destructive behavior.
During the 1810s, for example, three students were expelled for 
exploding gunpowder in the building, another for unforgivably 
ringing the belfry bell at 3:00 a.m., while another vandalized a Bible 
by cutting a deck of playing cards into its leaves, and others set off 
firecrackers indoors and scrawled graffiti on the walls, a sequence 
that reached a climax of sorts when several students exploded 
a gunpowder- filled log inside the hall, only to be topped three 
11years later by a group who nailed all the building’s doors shut and 
shouted “Rebellion!” and “Fire!” (Wertenbaker 1946, 156, 167).
Anyone even remotely aware of the sexualized emotions that 
simmer beneath the surface of collegiate life, sometimes violently, 
will recognize this ritual misbehavior as more than just boys testing 
the patience of their surrogate parents. It may indeed be that, like 
Artaud, these student- subjects, wanting to be “done with the judg-
ment of God,” or at least of their parents, are experimenting on the 
body of the college, looking for ways to defeat it, to dismember it, 
even to make it into a “body- without- organs.” But in so doing, they 
also affirm that body’s personhood, its organic- machinic subjectivity. 
This violence belongs to the order of “male fantasy,” which, as Klaus 
Theweleit ([1987] 1989) showed, mixes desire, fear, hatred, and 
love with a will to power focused on and through the technologi-
cally produced corporate organism. In the process, that organism 
becomes a real subject, organized by media in the expanded 
sense of a material environment like the all- purpose Nassau Hall 
or its northern relative, Dartmouth Hall. As Daniel Webster said of 
Dartmouth College, the institution embodied in the building, there 
are necessarily “those who love it.” Like the news that businesses 
have souls, this is enough to make us shudder.
When we say that media organize, then, and go so far as to assert 
that the term media is even defined by this organizational function, 
we are actually speaking of an intermediality that runs, in this case, 
from paper to candlelight to recitation room to courtroom, and well 
beyond. And if to organize is to distribute the background noise of 
a “glacial reality,” a “river of ever- flowing water,” into a nonfictional 
organism capable of bearing rights, being hated, and being loved, 
the field of practices that recognize this organism and make it into 
a subject runs in a highly modulated continuum from oral examina-
tion (or job interview, as the case may be) to nocturnal outburst. 
That field’s organization— into patterns of power, knowledge, and 
desire— is not legible outside the ensuing interactions. Arising from 
all of this, the corporate person warrants our closest attention.
12 Machines
As I have argued, media organize social and political life, as well as 
the social and political imagination, through a variety of channels 
that extend well beyond the communicative functions traditionally 
ascribed to technical devices like Kittler’s celebrated triumvirate 
of “gramophone, film, typewriter.” In treating things like buildings 
as media, we are extending analytic techniques developed to un-
derstand these more classical media formats into areas that have 
analytical languages of their own. The methodological challenge, 
then, is to translate the one into the other without flattening 
either into unrecognizability. For this, an intermediary language 
is helpful. Therefore the following excursus continues in the 
Deleuzo- Guattarian idiom, in an effort to be both theoretically and 
descriptively specific.
Consider the term machine. There is a long tradition in archi-
tectural studies that treats buildings as machines. Among that 
tradition’s most eloquent representatives is the American cultural 
critic Lewis Mumford, whose intellectual project was, in many 
respects, to secularize what he called in his later work the “myth 
of the machine.” By this Mumford meant the metaphysical power 
attributed by the mid- twentieth century to mechanization, the chief 
example of which was the social and political order inaugurated by 
nuclear weaponry. The “machine,” in Mumford’s sense, was much 
more than the weaponry itself; it was the entire social and political 
system to which nuclear weapons belonged— the military, the 
corporations, the universities— a system, or in Mumford’s terms a 
“complex,” that closely resembles one of Foucault’s “apparatuses.”
But where do these apparatuses come from? In the chapter of A 
Thousand Plateaus immediately prior to that devoted to the “body 
without organs,” Deleuze and Guattari address this question by 
rethinking semiotics in a manner that culminates in the elusive 
concept of the “abstract machine.” An abstract machine is, in their 
language, something like the operating system of a corporeal 
“assemblage” (or sometimes a “machinic assemblage”), which we 
13can understand as Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to Foucault’s 
sociotechnical “apparatus.” In the background runs an effort to 
rethink communication by recasting the sign– signified relation 
as merely one of many possible semiotic systems, or “regimes of 
signs.” Of these many regimes, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 135) 
identify four: a “presignifying semiotic,” to which they somewhat 
dubiously link certain premodern societies; a “signifying semiotic” 
centered on the signifier– signified relation, which they identify with 
the despotic state or the Judeo- Christian God; a “countersignifying 
semiotic” operated by a revolutionary nomadic “war machine”; and 
a “postsignifying semiotic” governed by what they call “passional” 
forms of subjectification. Despite appearances, these are not 
evolutionary stages. In the Deleuzo- Guattarian idiom, they are 
strata, or organizational levels, that coexist in impure mixtures in 
any given historical situation. Nonetheless, any given situation will 
favor one stratum or the other, or one particular admixture over 
another. Historical change entails a move from one stratum to the 
other through semiotic recombination or reshuffling.
Each stratum also takes a specific organizational form. Presig-
nification is plurivocal. It proceeds along discrete segments, or 
pathways, in which signs do not refer to other signs but rather 
belong to particular ritual- lived domains where expressions do not 
translate from one to the other. In contrast, signification is concen-
tric. Signs refer to other signs in a semiotic spiral, with each new 
ring corresponding to a new form of interpretation governed by 
priests, psychoanalysts, and other “despots” paranoically orbiting 
an empty, metaphysical center, whereas countersignification is 
numerical, where number does not represent or signify anything; 
rather, it arranges and distributes, or organizes. A countersig-
nifying machine is like a nomadic military system distributed 
numerically “into tens, fifties, hundreds, thousands, etc.” that aims 
to abolish the sedentary state but is also adopted by it. Finally, 
postsignification is punctual. It operates around what Deleuze 
and Guattari call “points of departure” that mark two forms of 
subjectivity, the “subject of enunciation” and the “subject of the 
14 statement,” joined by a line that brings both into being. Postsignifi-
cation is active rather than ideational. It is, they say, authoritarian 
rather than despotic, proletarian rather than bourgeois, and 
monomaniacal rather than paranoid, more like Franz Kafka’s linear 
bureaucratic “proceedings” than the jurist Daniel Paul Schreber’s 
“radiating paranoia” (117– 21).
The two postsignifying subjects, of enunciation and of the state-
ment, can be distinguished from the punctual “sender” and “ad-
dressee” of mid- century communications theory in two ways. First, 
they do not preexist the signifying act but rather are constituted 
by it. Second, from the point of view of the “abstract machine” gov-
erning the entire system, these two forms of subjectivity ultimately 
belong to one and the same subject, who is not so much split but 
doubled up into a subject that obeys its own commands.
Constantly changing places, these “points of departure” for 
subjectification are always multiple not only within a given society 
but within a given individual.7 Hence subjects— in our opening 
example, corporate persons, meaning both the colleges and their 
students— are not just speaking subjects, determined in the legal 
context from which they emerged by a capacity for (or a “right” to) 
political speech. Like all other subjects, corporate persons arise 
from a constant movement from point to point and from speaker 
to receiver, always doubling up enunciation and statement. They 
speak and are spoken to at once, in an internalized feedback loop: 
“The subject of enunciation recoils into the subject of the statement, 
to the point that the subject of the statement resupplies [a] subject 
of enunciation for another proceeding” (129, emphasis original). 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to the line along which this process 
occurs as a “passional line” that originates with, or departs from, 
a point of subjectification, which can be anything in the world. For 
someone in love, for example, this point can be what they call a 
“faciality trait” (let’s say, a building facade, or a sculpture of Alma 
Mater), where “faciality” no longer refers to an embodied signifier 
but rather acts as a trigger for— again in the Deleuzo- Guattarian 
idiom— “deterritorialized” associations along a “line of flight” (129). 
15Under the sign of corporate personhood, I am suggesting, this line 
ultimately becomes circular.
An assemblage governed by an abstract machine comprises both 
sides of this doubling. On one side is enunciation, which “formalizes 
expression,” and on the other is the field of contents, or embodied, 
normalizing statements like those issued by teachers under strictly 
delimited speaking conditions to organize a “machinic assemblage 
or an assemblage of bodies” in the sense that Foucault attributes, 
for example, to the carceral or disciplinary apparatus. But the 
causal relation between the two is nonlinear; forms of content 
(bodies organized into/by statements) cannot be derived linearly 
from modes or structures of enunciation or expression. That is, stu-
dents cannot be derived from teachers or teachers from students; 
nor can either be derived from the educational institution. Rather, 
teachers, students, and schools are joined in a circular abstract ma-
chine, which I have called above a “person,” and which “operates by 
matter, not by substance; by function, not by form,” by way of what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “a diagram independent of the forms 
and substances, expressions and contents it will distribute” (141). 
Abstract machines do not communicate, in the sense of transmit-
ting messages or expressions; rather, “writing now functions on the 
same level as the real, and the real materially writes” (141).
Abstract machines, which we can still call media, are therefore 
neither infrastructural nor transcendental; rather, they are 
immanent to semiotechnics, where they play a creative “piloting 
role.” To specify the type of abstraction they have in mind, Deleuze 
and Guattari add another category to the Peircean semiotic triad 
of indexes, icons, and symbols, which they call (again after Peirce) 
a “diagram.” Not exactly a visual map or code, a diagram is, in this 
sense, more like a coherent set of techniques for, as they put it, 
“conjugating matter and function” (143). In the case of the corpo-
rate person, “love,” in my argument, is one such technique.
Circumscribed as it may be by an idiosyncratic philosophical 
system, the set of concepts derived from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
16 pragmatic semiotics is useful in sketching the rudiments of a media 
theory of organization to the extent that it expands that term’s— 
“organization’s”— referents. Among the examples with which 
Deleuze and Guattari conclude their revision of semiotics is a brief 
analysis of the proposition “I love you.” They ask to what regime the 
proposition might belong. For us, this is principally the passional or 
postsignifying regime, mixed with the oedipal, patriarchal signifying 
or despotic regime. They ask what translations it enables. For us, 
as we will shortly see, it entails among others a translation with the 
countersignifying war machine. They ask what is its diagram, what 
are its abstract machines? For us, it is postpanoptic but still circular. 
Finally, they ask to what machinic assemblages it belongs. For us: 
the “megamachine” (147– 48).
Still bearing in mind the example of the corporate antebellum col-
lege but now moving the genealogical needle significantly forward 
to the modern (and postmodern) corporation, we can understand 
the proposition “I love you” as harboring a set of organizational 
techniques that are hardly limited to those from which the set of 
legal– juridical statements associated with corporate personhood 
eventually derived. Among these techniques, the organization 
of subjects into bodies deserves further elaboration. Having 
described passional love as an intense form of intersubjective dou-
bling, a “cogito built for two” that is also always a betrayal, a turning 
away of faces, Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly point out that with 
every opening, there is a closing. The open field of promiscuous, 
polysemic coupling closes down into conjugality (the nuclear 
family), and the polymorphous cogito becomes a bureaucracy (the 
office) where the bureaucrat, or we could add, the student- teacher, 
says “I think” (131– 32). Impassioned declarations of love, then, are 
double sided. On one hand, they operate the abstract machine 
and the diagram— “love”— to produce new, uninhibited couplings, 
bodies- without- organs in which we discern remnants of the “desir-
ing machines” of the Anti- Oedipus. While on the other hand, these 
declarations of love domesticate desire in a bureaucratic assem-
blage of nucleated, signifying couples mixed with a war machine.
17In recent times, the name of that bureaucratic assemblage has 
been the state. To explain, Deleuze and Guattari borrow from 
Mumford, whom they summon alongside Marx to chart the longue 
durée of “capture,” or state formation, by what Mumford calls a 
“megamachine.” Associating what Mumford describes as the des-
potic “megamachines” of the ancient empires with Marx’s “Asiatic” 
or imperial– agrarian mode of production and exchange, Deleuze 
and Guattari trace a genealogy of the state as a system of capture 
that converts territory into land, property, and credit through a 
series of techniques including rent, profit, and taxation (443– 44). 
Today, the governing paradigm of capture is the corporation.
But what happens when the ruled says to the ruler, “I love you”? 
At first glance, this would seem the simplest of interpellations with 
transparently pastoral origins, wherein the ruled willingly responds 
to a command to submit. This, however, decodes the exclamation 
only at the level of the signifying regime, with its spiral of interpre-
tations spinning around an empty, metaphysical void. “Hey, you 
there!” says Louis Althusser’s state apparatus. You turn to face the 
police, thereby closing the circle and inaugurating the hermeneutic 
inquest: Are you a criminal? Are you hungry? Are you mad? Are 
you married? Whereas, on the “passional” level, state and subject 
trade places in the semiotic system, doubling up into temporarily 
unstable chimeras— Donna Haraway’s ([1984] 1991) cyborgs— 
switching uniforms and recoding bodies. This is the level on which 
corporations, as organs of capture derived from and supporting 
the capitalist state, become persons capable of loving and being 
loved.
It is no accident, then, that Mumford’s rage against the modern, 
nuclear- armed “megamachine,” which threatens to recapitulate 
the cruelties of ancient despots with an exponentially enhanced 
efficiency, returns repeatedly to communications technologies. 
Standing opposite the ordering systems of the military– industrial 
complex, he argues, are Marshall McLuhan’s “trancelike” predictions 
of “an electronic anti- megamachine programmed to accelerate 
disorder, ignorance, and entropy.” “In revolt against totalitarian 
18 organization and enslavement,” says Mumford in 1970, “the gen-
eration now responding to McLuhan’s doctrines would seek total 
‘liberation’ from organization, continuity, and purpose of any sort in 
systematic de- building, dissolution, and de- creation. Ironically, such 
a return to randomness would, according to probability theory, 
produce the most static and predicable state possible: that of 
unorganized ‘matter’” (293).
All of this appears on pages referenced by Deleuze and Guattari, 
and we would not be wrong in noticing a relationship between 
what Mumford calls “unorganized matter” and the “body without 
organs.” Recall, however, that a key attribute of the abstract 
machine is that it is material but insubstantial. The anorganic 
body (the BwO) is an intermediary operating in the no- man’s land 
between substance and matter, form and formlessness, out of 
which the paranoid idealizations of absolute organization and 
absolute entropy spring. The diagrammatic abstract machine, 
which I am still calling a “person,” is immanent to the sociotechnical 
assemblage of the megamachine without being identical with it; a 
pure yet always emergent functionality distinguishes this “person” 
from an “ideal” form or a universal axiomatic (like, say, the “human” 
of humanism), while its sociotechnical diffusion makes it more real 
than formal abstractions like “sender” or “receiver.” So can there 
be a media theory of abstract machines? Yes, when we correlate 
the two poles of organization and entropy with a deterritorializing 
(or disorganizing) and reterritorializing (or reorganizing) movement 
between semiotic levels and between “apparatuses of capture,” 
meaning regimes of power, within which diagrams become legible 
and operate.
Mumford (1970, 378– 93) responded to the totalitarian organization 
of the Cold War megamachine (which he also called the “Power 
Complex”) by calling for an “organic world picture” embodied in 
a “new organum.” Calls like this, which in Mumford’s case sought 
a biotechnical homeostasis understood ecologically rather than 
mechanically, were a commonplace of the “new humanism” that 
dominated antitechnocratic thought during the mid- century, of 
19which Mumford’s, like Norbert Wiener’s, was a representative voice. 
What he, Wiener, and many of their contemporaries missed, how-
ever, was that, in posing as a form of organized life— in Mumford’s 
case, decentralized, face- to- face, communal— that escaped both 
the rigid, institutional powers of the military– industrial complex 
and the entropy of a technophilic counterculture, this humanist 
organicism (what Wiener called “the human use of human beings”) 
belonged to a new machinic assemblage and a new diagram 
of power in its own right: the corporation- as- person and the 
person- as- corporation.
We can call this diagram “organizational” in a sense that trans-
lates the paranoid, modular signifying systems of an indifferent 
“megamachine” into the intimate, “passional” domain of corporate 
personhood with which we began. Mumford encapsulates the 
long- term transition between what Deleuze and Guattari call 
“apparatuses of capture” with a comparison between the Egyptian 
sun god, Re, and the modern megamachine, or as his subtitle calls 
it, the “Pentagon of Power.” What the sun god enunciates with 
sublime monuments, the modern state insinuates:
In more devious symbolic ways these same awe- inspiring 
creatures still stand at the portals of the Power Penta-
gon today, though the god they represent, whose secret 
knowledge cannot be challenged and whose divine com-
mands cannot be questioned, turns out actually to be, 
when one tears aside the curtain, only the latest model 
IBM computer, zealously programmed by Dr. Strangelove 
and his assistants. (Mumford 1970, 403)
Perhaps, however, in his eagerness to decode Dr. Strangeglove  
as a sign of the times, Mumford forgot the ironic subtitle of Stan-
ley Kubrick’s 1964 antinuclear send- up: “How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Bomb.” What the film satirizes as willing 
interpellation into the megamachine’s logic of “mutually assured 
destruction” (MAD) was, in fact, its means of production: if not 
exactly love, then recognition, as in a mirror.
20 The Cold War megamachine is a bureaucracy piloted by what 
we might call, in a Deleuzo- Guattarian manner, a “Strangeglove 
abstract machine.” In such a machine, both syntagmatically and 
paradigmatically, the “I” that loves “the bomb” is the conjugal and 
bureaucratic double of the organizational complex, in whom a 
passion for the self as a thinking– feeling subject (as consumer and 
as corporation) combines with family values and corporate con-
formism. On the conjugal– bureaucratic normalization of passional 
love, Deleuze and Guattari write (1987, 132),
Conjugality is the development of the couple, and bu-
reaucracy is the development of the cogito. But one is 
contained in the other: amorous bureaucracy, bureau-
cratic couple. Too much has been written on the double, 
haphazardly, metaphysically, finding it everywhere, in any 
old mirror, without noticing the specific regime it pos-
sesses both in a mixed semiotic where it introduces new 
phases, and in the pure semiotic of subjectification where 
it inscribes itself on a line of flight and introduces very 
particular figures.
But where, they argue, at the level of the signifying regime, these 
kinds of redundancies are most often described in terms of 
frequency (of signifier– signified, sign– sign relations), in the post-
signifying or passional regime of subjectification, redundancy is 
a form of resonance, an echo, which transmediates mirror- optics 
into audio- acoustics (132– 33). Thus, on the order of signification, 
in learning to “love” the megamachine, the organized corporate 
subject recognizes herself in the blankness of its reflective surfaces. 
While on the order of subjectification, megamachine and corporate 
subject bring one another into being along a resonant, passional 
“line of flight” distantly descended from the orator Daniel Webster’s 
impassioned voice arguing for corporate rights before the Supreme 
Court: “And yet there are those who love it.”
An emergent sovereign— the corporate “person,” as individual 
and as group— whose organic, organized body reterritorializes 
21the whole affair, blocks escape along this line. In a manner related 
to what the medievalist Ernst Kantorowicz described as the 
“king’s two bodies,” the new sovereign’s body is also doubled up, 
comprising on one hand living organs, in the bodies of its mortal 
human constituents and their sociotechnical apparatuses, and on 
the other a seemingly immortal being, the bureaucratic cogito (in-
terpellated by the old IBM command: “Think”), whose life extends 
beyond that of any individual. Rather than remaining trapped, 
then, in a prison house of language or of concentric signifiers, as 
in Bentham’s panopticon, the prisoner, subject of the conjugal 
family and of the office bureaucracy out of which the “bomb” was 
born, builds a postpanoptic prison even as she is built by it, in a 
recursive process for which the Deleuzian term assemblage, with 
its echoes of the linear, mechanistic “assembly line,” is not entirely 
adequate. The term complex brings us closer, with its evocation 
of nonlinear networks and feedback loops. More literal still is the 
circle, which echoes in the mixed semiotic of the megamachine 
the redundant despotisms of signification spinning around 
an empty center (Artaud’s “judgment of God,” Strangeglove’s 
paranoia), but actually comprises an amorous, feedback- based 
network: a network of circles. Of this, a brief concluding example 
must suffice.
Circles
The most complete corporate body is circular. Today, both 
sociologists and entrepreneurs might describe what are known 
colloquially as “social circles” or “circles of friends” as networks, to 
emphasize the interconnectedness of their members as well as 
their seemingly inherent incompleteness and open- endedness. 
Organization, in this language, is pattern based in the sense that 
it entails the networked formation of social bodies, with different 
degrees and types of hierarchy, and different mechanisms of inclu-
sion and exclusion. But it may well be that the older colloquialism, 
“social circles,” captures something that the newer one, “social 
networks,” leaves out.
22 When, to assist fellow college students in recognizing one another 
on campus and, we can infer, as future alumni bound filially and fi-
nancially to Alma Mater, more recent subjects of the megamachinic 
complex converted printed college “facebooks” into an online 
platform, they conjugated the bureaucratic coupling of love and 
(re)cognition already present on campus under a watchful motherly 
gaze, into a new and properly circular being: the individual as a 
corporate person. This being’s diagram is satirized, incompletely, in 
Dave Eggers’s (2013) novel of passional, tech- campus subjectifica-
tion, The Circle. The obvious architectural reference (and Bentham 
equivalent) is not Facebook but rather the new Apple campus 
designed by the architect Norman Foster in Cupertino, California, 
as an enormous circular extrusion, with a minimalist, streamlined 
shell; a pleasantly empty, landscaped center; and a more or less 
continuous 1970s- style “office landscape” (Bureaulandschaft) 
interior. In Eggers’s novel, the narrative turns on the project of 
“closing” the Circle (the name of the corporation in question) by 
incorporating all of humanity into its networks, a quest led by an 
improbably earnest protagonist who begins her employment as a 
customer service representative at what amounts to an on- campus 
call center. Following a familiar Silicon Valley pattern, the corpo-
ration’s forever- new office complex grows rapidly into something 
resembling a residential college campus, with a full suite of leisure 
activities, medical services, and dormitories to complement the 
open work areas where “Circlers” communicate with one another 
and with their clients. Insubordination of the nineteenth- century 
sort is unheard of.
A central technique for achieving corporate closure is the customer 
survey, which plays a role comparable to that of the examination, 
the classic disciplinary instrument of educational institutions. In a 
parody of the social media system of ratings and reviews, Eggers 
portrays the quest for ever higher customer satisfaction as a form 
of recruitment into the social circles of the corporation. Employees, 
who are acutely aware of their various scores (including one for 
participation in on- campus after- hours social programs), build 
23ever- growing concentric relationships of sympathy, admiration, 
support, and— yes— love with customers who appear principally 
as names and addresses rather than faces. The technical systems 
including the buildings and the personnel that enable all of this are 
necessary but not sufficient for the organization, or, in Mumford’s 
terms, the social organism, to survive and thrive. There must 
also be something like an abstract machine— let us call it a “love” 
machine— that all of these processes operate materially. If its 
diagram, like that of Bentham’s panopticon, is circular, it is in a 
decentered rather than a centered sense, for in the Circle we are 
principally in Deleuze and Guattari’s postsignifying regime. Where 
Bentham’s concentric prison retained a ghostly, godlike referent 
at its voided center, Foster’s (and Eggers’s) circular form, like the 
data gathered by and about the Circlers, “means” nothing, nor does 
it ask us to decode its nonexistent semantics. In the novel, nearly 
ubiquitous, miniaturized audiovisual surveillance does play its part 
in eliciting social performances from customers that draw them fur-
ther in, but it is a form of surveillance— and mutual recognition— in 
which everyone is watching everyone else without hierarchies of 
the teacher– student, parent– child, employer– employee, warden– 
prisoner variety. Rather, only relations of inside and outside obtain. 
Either you are inside the circle or you are not.
Eggers, who appears uncomfortable with satire, limits his critique 
to one close to Mumford’s: behind the Circle is a machine that 
distorts human relations into numerical ones. But lest we forget, 
the Circle is, like Apple, Facebook, and all the rest, a person. I 
deliberately do not enclose that term in scare quotes (“person”) to 
emphasize the reality of the abstraction. Neither in the novel nor 
in the film based on it do we find much evidence of the organon, 
or curriculum, from which the Circle might have derived when 
we remember its origins on the college campus. What we see 
instead is an evacuation of that curriculum, in the traditional sense 
of a medium of Bildung, or of personal growth, in favor of sheer 
face- to- face- to- face- to- face communication among subjects of 
enunciation- without- statements, content- free expressions of pure 
24 recognition that, pace Mumford, do not tend toward entropy but 
rather toward tautological, circular organization. For the person is 
the real name for the diagram and the abstract machine that the 
modern corporation operates, as an institution that demands, with 
grim determination, our deepest affection, if not our undying love.
And yet, visible evidence of the military– security megamachine 
is mostly absent from The Circle. In its place are needy, vacant, 
rebellious consumer- humans, embodied parodies of the counter-
culture (Turner 2006). At one level, the elision is straightforwardly 
ideological; the very term social media masks the historical relation, 
traceable to Norbert Wiener’s early servomechanisms, between 
feedback and targeting. Where there are targets, whether of 
missiles or of marketing, there are commanders ready to issue the 
command: “Fire!” In Silicon Valley as elsewhere, these commanders 
remain in abundant supply. But a media theory that considers 
only them remains a theory of signification devoted principally to 
demystifying the “judgment of God.” To touch what Deleuze and 
Guattari awkwardly call the “postsignifying” level, or better, the 
“passional” level, we must learn to see the circle itself as an embod-
ied, sovereign being doubled up in the bodies of its subjects. In that 
sense, the organic social body incorporated by social media is the 
megamachine.
So yes, media organize. This does not mean that all forms of or- 
ganization, networked or otherwise, tend toward domination. On 
the contrary, media enable solidarities of all kinds. Nor does the 
genealogy of corporate affection I have sketched herein simply and 
irresponsibly replace human agency with an allegedly impersonal 
system, or complex. Rather, my effort has been to recognize how, 
over time, that system has been personalized in a practical, per-
formative sense. To replace the deadly megamachine with other, 
more just forms of collective life requires breaking the circle of 
corporate personhood. Among other things, this means unlearning 
how to love the bomb by refusing that circle’s disarmingly friendly, 
and sometimes amorous, advances.
25But it also means learning to live with the ruins of past solidarities 
and their institutional forms while affirming their ghostly per-
sistence. If my historical argument has suggested anything, it is that 
when it comes to the incorporation of subjects, our newest media 
forms or platforms are not entirely new. This perspective restates 
the problem as one of confronting what persists as well as what 
changes, both materially and conceptually. To conclude with an-
other, seemingly incongruous architectural example: in the Circle, 
the most dedicated employees live on campus, in dormitories. An 
important counterpoint (but also silent partner) to the corporate 
organizational matrices of the 1950s and 1960s were the massive 
social housing programs associated with the welfare state and 
with state socialism, begun in the 1920s and continued around the 
world until about 1970. Their dismantling, often accompanied by 
spectacular, mass- mediated demolitions, is one of the hallmarks of 
the neoliberal era. The response on the Left has been ambivalent. 
On one hand, these “projects” were avatars of economic redistri-
bution and, sometimes, of genuine collectivism; equally, however, 
they were the biopolitical instruments of paternalistic, racist, and 
imperialist state bureaucracies. Hence, in a signal instance of 
performative incommunicability, summoning their ghosts in an 
affirmative, nonnostalgic fashion has proved exceptionally difficult, 
if not impossible.
Can the question of organization, then, critically posed, be redirect-
ed away from claustrophobic corporate feedback loops and toward 
concerns as prosaic— and, dare I say, as universal— as housing? 
Rephrasing the housing question in this manner is well beyond the 
scope of what I have attempted here. I refer to it only to concretize 
the implications and open the frame of reference. Follow any 
network and you find that its edges fray. There, illuminated by the 
fluorescent light of history, the outside occasionally enters in.
Notes
With gratitude to Timon Beyes, Lisa Conrad, Götz Bachmann, Ned Rossiter, and 
Geert Lovink for their thoughtful responses to this text.
26  1 On “immaterial production,” see, e.g., Hardt and Negri (2009, 132– 33).
 2 The following discussion of colleges and corporate personhood is adapted 
from my more detailed “Corporate Personhood: Notes toward an Architectural 
Genealogy” (Martin 2017). On the political and legal history of corporate per-
sonhood, see Maier (1993) and Winkler (2018).
 3 Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910), http://caselaw.findlaw 
.com/us-supreme-court/216/400.html. For a summary of this history, see Bar-
kan (2013) and Sklar (1988, 49– 53).
 4 Barkan refuses this distinction, arguing instead that corporate personhood 
constitutes a dispositif or apparatus critical to “corporate sovereignty,” which, 
like the dispositif of the “person” more generally, as theorized by the philos-
opher Roberto Esposito after Giorgio Agamben, operates a “ban” whereby 
the corporate entity is granted exceptional legal status or rights in the name, 
paradoxically, of fulfilling its societal obligations under the law (Barkan 2013, 
76– 86). On legal personhood as a concrete performative, see Dewey (1926).
 5 On the history of the corporate charter, see Handlin and Handlin (1945).
 6 For a detailed study of the Dartmouth case, see Stites (1972). The “contracts 
clause” is to be found in article I, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.
 7 As Deleuze and Guattari put it (1987, 129), “the various forms of education 
or ‘normalization’ imposed upon an individual consist in making him or her 
change points of subjectification, always moving toward a higher, nobler one in 
closer conformity with the supposed ideal. Then from the point of subjectifica-
tion issues a subject of enunciation, as a function of mental reality determined 
by that point. Then from that subject of enunciation issues a subject of the 
statement, in other words, a subject bound to statements in conformity with 
a dominant reality (of which the mental reality just mentioned is a part, even 
when it seems to oppose it).”
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Organizing	Media:	
Security	and	
Entertainment
Timon Beyes
Orgware
One of the most remarkable works on display at 2015’s Venice 
Biennale in Italy was Simon Denny’s installation Secret Power. Con-
cocted with the designer David Bennewith, the exhibition staged an 
artistic inquiry into how the world is imagined, mapped, and orga-
nized according to the National Security Agency (NSA) and its “Five 
Eyes” allies, the intelligence apparatuses of the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Representing New Zealand 
in the Biennale’s exhausting mix of centrally curated show and 
dozens of national pavilions, Secret Power’s main location was the 
time- honored Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, a library representing 
Venice as an affluent and influential world power during the Re-
naissance. Completed in 1588, the Renaissance Biblioteca had been 
built in an era of expansionism, empire, and early globalization. 
It was designed to celebrate culture, knowledge, and science in 
harmony with civil and military duties and, of course, the church. 
Its walls are adorned with paintings by then- famous artists (Titian, 
Tintoretto, and Veronese among them), depicting philosophers  
and thinkers, and its ceilings with allegorical images about the 
30 organization of knowledge and power as enacted by the organi-
zational apparatuses of state, military, and church. In the early 
seventeenth century, the Venetian authorities decreed that a copy 
of each and every new publication would need to be deposited in 
the library. Celebrating the medium of the book and of maps— 
among them Fra Mauro’s Map of the World from circa 1450, which 
summarizes the cartographic thought of its time— in 2015, the 
library’s walls and ceilings serve as iconographic backdrop and 
correspondence to Secret Power.
Denny and Bennewith have turned the library into a contem-
porary server room. In an infrastructural double of hardware 
and exhibition architecture, the visitor encounters an ensemble 
of nine half- empty server racks— in Plexiglas enclosures that 
simultaneously work as vitrines— and a workstation. Moving from 
vitrine to vitrine perhaps echoes the practice of browsing from one 
internet window to the next (Gad 2015, 188). The blinking hard 
drives integrated into the racks are apparently at work, processing 
data and generating information that the visitors cannot access; 
one has to make do with what is made visible to the human eye. 
Roughly one- half of the “server vitrines” focus on a montage and 
sculptural interpretations of selected sets of slides and documents 
[Figure 2.1]. Simon Denny, Secret Power, installation view, Marciana Library, 2015. 
Photograph by Jens Ziehe.
31leaked by Edward Snowden. Vis- à- vis, the other half of the vitrines 
is stranger still. The objects on display are based on the portfolio 
of a designer and entrepreneur by the name of David Darchicourt, 
whose social media profile states that he was the NSA’s creative 
director of defense intelligence from 2001 to 2012. The material 
visually resembles the NSA infographics, tools, and plans as well as 
other material leaked by Snowden. Yet it seems to (at least mainly) 
consist of Darchicourt’s own work as well as sculptural reinterpre-
tations of his designs.
Nothing here seems made up or invented by the artist. Presenting 
a “mimesis of the given” (Foster 2017, 78), most of the material was 
found on the internet, then partly processed and remediated, syn-
thesized and collated, by the artist. The rendering of the material 
is on one hand forensic, evidence exhibited and magnified. Yet the 
connections and juxtapositions seem impressionistic and circum-
stantial, conjectural and speculative (Leonard 2015). There is an 
obvious allegorical layer, given the juxtaposition of contemporary 
“secret power” and the historical depictions (of power and knowl-
edge) on the library’s walls and ceiling. At the same time, the instal-
lation’s atmosphere is brash and vulgar, since the presentation of 
the material relies strongly on commercial printing and prototyping 
techniques, perhaps harking back to the Wunderkammer aesthetics 
of early museums and libraries (Byrt 2016). Overall, it seems more 
trade fair than art space— as if an ethnographic museum would try 
to present the workings of intelligence agencies.1
Forensic and allegorical, ethnographic and speculative: what is at 
stake in the exhibition, and what it enables the viewer to register 
and think, goes beyond the staging of an intelligence agency’s visual 
culture. On display are organizational documents and machines, 
symbols and traces, agents and structures: the installation is largely 
made up of orgware. It is “speaking of organization in its own lan-
guage” (Latour 2013a, 381). Yet, in suggesting conjectures and con-
nections between these materials, and in relation to the allegorical 
depictions of the organization of power/knowledge that adorn the 
library’s walls and ceiling, the exhibition goes further than speaking 
32 of organization in its own language. It seems to speculatively trace 
a contemporary constellation of sociotechnical ordering and its ef-
fects. This constellation or nexus operates both technologically and 
aesthetically: it relies on media infrastructures and networks, and 
it shapes what can be experienced and expressed. This way, Secret 
Power not only makes manifest what might be the most elaborated 
and wide- ranging surveillance system ever imagined (Byrt 2016); it 
also presents a troubling interdependence of technologically driven 
forms of organizing and conjures up an organizational nexus that 
coalesces around modes of algorithmic and affective, bureaucratic 
and entrepreneurial, ordering.
Thinking Organizationally
The Berlin- based and New Zealand– born Denny has been called a 
“post- internet artist” (Leonard 2015, 11). His work suits the notion 
of a “postdigital aesthetics” in that it takes pervasive digitization 
of everyday life, global networking of communication, “and the 
immersive and disorientating experiences of computational 
infrastructures” for granted (Berry and Dieter 2015, 5). Schooled in 
conceptualism, pop art, and minimalism, and working with all sorts 
of artistic media, the artist investigates and makes present the 
images, rhetorics, and mechanisms— or perhaps the visual clutter, 
rhetorical noise, and hidden operations— of an organized world 
shaped by pervasive and ubiquitous computing. According to writer 
and art critic Chris Kraus (2015, 20), Denny therefore engages in a 
kind of anthropology of contemporary media culture. He identifies 
aspects of this culture and then transplants and remediates them 
into the bracketed spaces of museums and galleries— perhaps a 
translation of the legacy of ready- made sculptures into a postdigital 
world (Byrt 2016).
Denny’s particular focus is on the digital economy, and he makes 
no secret of his infatuation with tech culture as it materializes in, 
and is driven by, businesses and start- ups.2 In its emphasis on 
organizational contexts, then, his work manifests a kind of artistic– 
33organizational research. An anthropologist’s eye is turned to the 
aesthetics of organization that shape, and that are shaped by, the 
age of ubiquitous computing and connectivity “after” digital media. 
In this sense, these installations present investigations of “organiza-
tion” and “organizing” as decisive phenomena of the contemporary 
media- technological situation. They interrogate and stage how 
“media organize” (Martin 2003, 15), how media are organized, and 
how organizing is mediated. They therefore perform a seemingly 
simple yet consequential recursive logic: to explore how media 
technologies condition contemporary life, one needs to inquire into 
their organizational effects. And to discuss how media technologies 
are produced, take place, disappear, or are transformed, one 
needs to trace the organizational constellations in which they are 
inscribed and which they make possible.3
Adopting Bruno Latour’s plea for the deployment of adverbial 
forms to understand organization as a “mode of existence” (Latour 
2013b), Denny’s work can thus be understood as an art of thinking 
and speaking organizationally. Thinking and speaking organi-
zationally means not to presuppose (an) organization as given 
framework and outcome but to employ the notion of organization 
as a preposition, which propels one to follow and trace the 
processes of organizing and being organized.4 As Latour puts it 
somewhat contortedly, this implies trying “to follow a particular 
being that would transport a force capable, in its displacements, of 
leaving in its wake something of organization no matter what the 
scale” (389– 90). He suggests following the circulation of multiple 
“scripts” of organizing, performative narratives that engage actors 
and in whose “scripting” actors participate (Latour 2013a, 391). Yet 
of course such scripts rely on material, technical, and embodied 
practices and infrastructures; they are mediated, affective, and 
discursive.5 These modes or scripts shape, yet are never limited 
to, formal entities such as corporations, state administrations, or 
clubs. As Latour puts it, organizations “remain always immanent 
to the instrumentarium that brings them into existence.” Hence 
organizations are “flat” (Latour 2013b, 49).
34 This epistemological angle might sound familiar to a media- 
theoretical perspective according to which a media- technological 
“instrumentarium” “determine[s] our situation” (Kittler 1999, xxxix). 
Yet it risks overlooking the recursive relation between media tech-
nology and social, or sociotechnical, ordering. As Reinhold Martin 
has shown with regard to the “military– industrial complex” in the 
U.S.- American context of the twentieth century, scripts or modes 
of organizing can constitute an “organizational complex” of power 
and knowledge. Such a complex both relies on and employs media 
technologies to shape what can be perceived and expressed. As 
“the aesthetic and technological extension of what has been known 
since the early 1960s as the ‘military– industrial complex’” (Martin 
2003, 3– 4), this organizational nexus enables the emergence of 
specific— consumerist, individualized, self- organized— subject 
positions as well as new forms of networked, deregulated control 
(Deleuze 1995). In this sense, organization is as immanent to the 
“instrumentarium” as is its productive agent and driving force. 
Thinking and speaking organizationally thus means assembling 
Latour’s “flat” and invariably mediated scripts and tracing, or 
speculating on, their convergence into a constellation of social 
organization. This, I think, is what Denny’s work and, in particular, 
Secret Power negotiates and asks us to consider.
Products	for	(and	of)	Organizing
To prepare a closer look at Secret Power and its scripts of socio-
technical ordering, I briefly dwell on another Denny installation 
that directly poses the question of organization. In Products for 
Organizing, on display at London’s Serpentine Gallery from the end 
of 2015 to early 2016, the exhibition space is (again) divided into 
two sections called Products for Emergent Organisations and Prod-
ucts for Formalised Organisations. Echoing Secret Power’s exhibition 
architecture, the former is made up of a series of vitrines designed 
for hard- drive stacks. The vitrines display a kind of sociomaterial 
history of hacking and hacker communities, yet one that is present-
ed as an organizational history, which focuses on what Denny calls 
35“organisational moments” (Gad 2015). It touches upon, for exam-
ple, the Tech Model Railroad Club of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, formed in the late 1940s and sometimes seen as the 
invention of hacking culture; the “blue box” sold on the University 
of California, Berkeley campus by Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs 
as a way of getting free long- distance calls; early hacking groups 
who broke into the Los Alamos National Laboratory; the invention 
of computer bulletin board systems as organizational devices; and 
cryptography and the “cypherpunks” of the 1980s and 1990s.
Along pieces of hardware now packaged as commodities— Wozniak 
and Job’s box here looks like a proper Apple product— there 
are documents that resemble technical manuals relating to key 
themes within the history of hacking. By “speaking organizationally” 
about such events, Denny not only insinuates that hacker groups 
developed their own “products for organizing”; he also seeks to 
trace and visualize the hacker movement’s organizational logics, 
presenting their emergence as a “product of organizing,” as it 
were. In this sense, “the objects that populate these narratives are 
presented as products capable of delivering certain organisational 
results: models for use, with packing suited to the reimagining” 
(Gad 2015, 190).
In the section on Products for Formalised Organisations, Denny as-
sembles three case studies of proper organizations: Apple; Zappos, 
the shoe sales company owned by Amazon; and Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British intelligence and 
security organization, which also appears in Secret Power. The cases 
reproduce “flat” managerial and operational models apparently 
at work in these organizations and designed to work flexibly and 
nonhierarchically. A tool called Agile is an outgrowth of collabora-
tive software- development methods, now translated into a kind 
of operating system for everyday organizational life. Another one, 
called Holacracy, endeavors to reconfigure an organization’s work 
relations in an antihierarchical and self- organized way. No matter 
whether the organization typologically belongs to the public or 
private sector, whether it is a sales platform or a security agency, 
36 postdigital organization here seems ordered according to models 
of distributed authority. Moreover, the organizations’ headquarters 
are on display in the form of architectural models, which perhaps 
not surprisingly take a loosely ring- shaped, circular form. This 
form is itself reproduced in internal visualizations, employed as a 
metaphor for the smooth and unhindered circulation of ideas.
In translating such “organizational moments” into visual, sculptural 
form— into “a monument to organisational life” (Gad 2015, 190)— 
Denny seems to embrace their materiality, images, metaphors, and 
human protagonists. The installation presents the interrelations of 
technology and organization as a pressing matter of concern in the 
age of pervasive and pervasively commercialized computing and 
therefore as self- evident subjects of contemporary artistic inquiry. 
[Figure 2.2]. Simon Denny, Products for Organising, formalized org chart, architectural 
model— GCHQ 2/Agile, 2015. Photograph by Nick Ash.
37The dichotomy of the two sections recalls Ned Rossiter’s (2006) 
distinction of “organized networks” and “networked organiza-
tions.” Organized networks employ the sociotechnical means of 
connectivity for new practices of organizing. They “are shaped by 
the power of socio- technical needs, interests, affects and passions 
that hold the potential to translate into new institutional forms” 
(208). Networked organizations, alternatively, “become networked 
in an attempt to recast [themselves] while retaining [their] basic 
infrastructure and work practices” (207). To some extent, Denny’s 
exhibition reproduces this distinction. Contemporary media 
technologies, that is, provoke both new forms of organizing (here 
manifested by the emergent and antihierarchical scene of hacker 
culture) and the partial transformation of established corporations 
and state administrations. Yet in thinking organizationally, or so 
I would argue, the artist undermines the spatial juxtaposition be-
tween two sections that stand for apparently antithetical organiza-
tional setups. Is it (still) the case that it is organized networks (and 
not networked organizations) that are marked by an atmosphere 
of openness, practices of sharing and more loosely project- based 
activities (Lovink and Rossiter 2011)? “In cartoons, flowcharts and 
glass- cased models, all inscribed with jaunty narratives, he portrays 
what ought to be opposing movements— the top- down structure 
of big business and the free, flat world of hacking— showing where 
they meet in the middle in corporations such as Apple” (Cumming 
2015). Arguably, this “middle” is constituted by media: by a set of 
shared technologies that enable organizing (note the exhibition 
title’s gerund) in different contexts and thus afford techies, 
entrepreneurs, and bureaucrats to jointly usher in a new age of 
sociotechnical organization.
Of course, the juxtaposition of emergent and formalized organi-
zation can be read as a story of co- optation: of countercultural ex-
periments and “moments” turned into instrumental tools to foster 
commerce, consumer captivation, and state surveillance. However, 
the genealogy of technology development in its cultural context 
tells a more complex story, according to which the legacy of the 
38 military– industrial complex and that of the American countercul-
ture comes together to spawn the “new economy” (Turner 2006). 
Denny’s installation seems closer to this kind of narrative. It draws 
parallels between— indeed, presents a fluid milieu of— commercial 
entities and hacker groups, bureaucrats and techies, and otherwise 
refrains from any conventionally critical position or statement. 
Of course, Denny could be accused of too easily believing in the 
relentless self- mythologization of the corporate world and a 
management discourse built on the rhetoric of participation and 
collaboration, thereby masking or disavowing the everyday life of 
hierarchy, domination, and control that shapes formal organiza-
tions. But precisely because there is no simple mechanism of cause 
and effect between collaborative technologies and the leveling 
of organizational hierarchies, Products for Organizing’s sculptural 
rendering of the scripts that circulate in emergent and formal 
organization hints at a broader organizational complex.
Secret Power ’s	Scripts	of	Organizing
As Products for Organizing perhaps most clearly shows, thinking 
organizationally can be described as “both . . . subject matter and 
methodology of [Denny’s] work” (e- flux 2015). Moving back to Secret 
Power, my intent is not to comprehensively discuss the wealth of 
connections, allusions, and the play of secrecy and transparency 
that the show stages. Assuming an organizational perspective as 
outlined above is itself an ordering device. It yields a specific lens 
on how the exhibition thematizes organization, and how it is itself 
organized. In this sense, the exhibition’s objects and relations sug-
gest three scripts of organization and media: secrecy, sensemaking, 
and entrepreneurship.
Organizational	Secrecy
The first script is connected to “the unlimited escalation of digital 
surveillance” (Galison 2016, 156). This is one effect of what Gallo-
way and Thacker (2007) have called the “new physics of organiza-
39tion” based on flat and distributed network technologies. However, 
as Denny’s installation insinuates, the new physics of organization 
can be closely intertwined with sovereign rule and bureaucratic 
control; networks have become a medium of sovereignty (Galloway 
and Thacker 2007, 20– 21). In this sense, the exhibition pictures the 
way the globe is protocologically organized and policed through 
distributed networks. This logic of capture is at work both in state 
administrations and private corporations, which often actively 
cooperate, as Snowden revealed.
The server vitrines dedicated to material released by Snowden 
present an attempt to examine “the way the contemporary world 
is depicted in imagery used by the NSA” (Higgins 2015). They 
make visible a networked topology of control and intervention as 
imagined by the Five Eyes intelligence agencies. One focus is on 
Treasure Map, regarded as one of the more shocking of Snowden’s 
revelations. This initiative is designed to map, monitor, and inter-
cept no less than the global data traffic, “which seeks to create a 
comprehensive world map of connected devices, with many layers 
of data and metadata” (Barr and Denny 2015, 97). Apart from 
turning the skull motif of the internal Treasure Map presentation 
into a sculptural piece of the iconic T- 800 skull from Terminator 2, 
Denny both reproduces explanatory slides leaked by Snowden and 
illustrates the program’s operational logic through amplifying its 
infrastructural layers. Then there are exhibits from— and inter-
pretations of— various, by- now infamous clandestine operations 
such as Fox Acid, Mystic and PoisonNut, designed to weaponize 
information technology. In assembling the Fox Acid material into a 
colorful and quite shocking mix of cartoons, crude jokes, explan-
atory tableaus, and infographics about network architectures, 
Denny emphasizes the operational setup for infiltrating personal 
computers through the back door of commercial internet providers 
(Kraus 2015, 23) in order to monitor and record all online activity, 
even to allow NSA operators to ghostwrite emails and social media 
postings “for” their victims, enabling a technologically advanced 
level of smear- campaigning.
40
The script of organizational secrecy as presented by Secret Power 
inverts and turns on its head the popular discourse of “organiza-
tional transparency” enabled through digital media. Transparency 
here does not imply user knowledge of the system but rather 
user ignorance (Rouvroy 2011). Organizational transparency is 
not transparency “for” the public but transparency of citizens for 
state bureaucracies (and corporate players), which themselves 
operate clandestinely through means of protocological control and 
intervention. While a media history of organization could be written 
along different sociotechnical formations of secrecy and transpar-
ency (Beyes and Pias 2019)6— indeed, the function of pyramidal 
hierarchies might lie in determining and mediating formal points 
of exchange and a modicum of transparency, thereby cloaking the 
rest of organizational conduct in informality and secrecy— today’s 
technological apparatuses enable and help to produce, in Peter 
Galison’s words, “a form of secrecy with no end date, no limit of 
scope, and little access.” Protocological organization is based on “a 
[Figure 2.3]. Simon Denny, Secret Power, installation view, Marciana Library, 2015. 
Photograph by Jens Ziehe.
41new ontology of hidden knowledge: multiple infinite secrets for a 
boundless conflict” (Galison 2010, 970). Arguably, it is this script of 
organization that, as Geert Lovink (2016, “Hermes on the Hudson”) 
wrote after the NSA scandal had broken, has “dashed to pieces” 
“the values of the internet generation,” which were predicated on 
“decentralization, peer- to- peer, rhizomes, networks.”
Organizational Sensemaking
Yet Secret Power is not only about networks of secrecy and control 
as imagined by the Five Eyes. Alongside the depictions of mass- 
surveillance programs and the policing of the globe, the vitrines 
entail a montage of objects and elements related to the intelligence 
agencies’ internal operations. Thus a second script of organization 
and media manifests itself in the visual aesthetics of internal intel-
ligence agency communication and the way these organizations 
make sense of their operations. Foreshadowing the (later) Products 
for Organizing, the focus here falls on a kind of management style: 
how such state bureaucracies imagine and render visible their 
tasks and processes. Steeped in geek- gamer tropes, internet 
memes, historical fantasies, and military and animal imagery, the 
way that cyberespionage operations are conveyed to the NSA’s 
employees and subcontractors is perhaps the viscerally most 
shocking experience of Denny’s handling and amplification of this 
material. As the Treasure Map and the FoxAcid iconography, as 
well as the maps, magicians, and soldiers that populate the slides 
leaked by Snowden, indicate, the myths, memes, and fantasies of 
the NSA itself come across as equally dark and brutal as they are 
childish, playful, and colorful— and, of course, heavily remediated. 
In Keller Easterling’s (2015, 182) words,
some of the most pervasive and under- examined aesthet-
ic regimes successfully migrate across military and com-
mercial environments as well as diametrically opposed 
political camps in ways that camouflage the real mes-
sages or actions of organisations. In these tableaus, the 
accoutrements of history often look like the middle- aged 
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mixed with the sort of drawings that can be found under 
the bed of a teenage boy.
Yet as Byrt (2016) argues, the visual references are far from acci-
dental: “They are targeted, precise and extraordinarily readable 
for the young men and women charged with implementing and 
overseeing such an epic surveillance system.” It is remarkable, 
moreover, how these figures and objects are partly at odds with 
and partly correspond to the allegorical Renaissance paintings in 
the library, establishing a strange iconographic dialogue of bearded 
men and fantastic, cartoonish animals as guardians and icons of 
power/knowledge.
In this sense, the tone of some of the allegorical depictions and 
all of the Five Eyes material is “unashamedly self- congratulatory” 
(Bennewith and Metahaven 2015, 27) and drenched in a kind of 
relentless optimism. It should give orthodox management theory 
pause— but I am afraid it won’t— that the management and leader-
ship models deployed within the NSA and the British Government 
Communications Headquarters (GHCQ), as far as I can see, quite 
faithfully resemble what students of business and management 
are confronted with. Perhaps the agencies are at the forefront 
of a certain kind of instrumental organizational thought, too. A 
model presented in the GHCQ’s The Art of Deception program, 
also leaked by Snowden and remediated by Denny, is constructed 
around the notion of “sensemaking.” The sensemaking approach 
is a prominent way of theorizing how organization works and how 
processes of organizing discursively unfold. Yet The Art of Decep-
tion bluntly shows what the field of organization studies, it seems, 
only recently discovered (Holt and Cornelissen 2013), namely, 
that the making of sense is aesthetically predicated on what can 
be sensed. As a dark art, it is prone to affective and atmospheric 
modulation. Such managerial reasoning, in other words, seems 
well aware that forces of organization increasingly work on the 
level of what N. Katherine Hayles (2006) called the “technological 
nonconscious.” Today’s atmospheric and immersive media are key 
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115). Intelligence agencies, or at least the Five Eyes of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, 
one can surmise from Secret Power, know and work with this kind 
of knowledge to make sense of and enact networked conditions of 
control and deception.
Entrepreneurs	of	Onflow
Apart from the invisible physics of organization and the internal 
organizational sensemaking and its aesthetics, there is a third 
script of organization and media at work in Secret Power. This script 
seems closely related to Denny’s prior work on the digital economy, 
its processes, subjects, and hyperbolic claims. It pertains to the not 
so secret star of the show, whom Denny and Bennewith discovered 
in their research and subsequently turned into a centerpiece of 
the installation: the designer David Darchicourt. Now running his 
own firm based in Maryland, Darchicourt was a graphic designer 
for the NSA from 1996 to 2001 and its creative director of defense 
intelligence from 2001 to 2012, “creating original graphics for NSA 
top leadership,” according to his social media profile. The server 
racks on the right- hand side of the library assemble work that he 
has done for and within the agency, some pieces of his freelance 
work, exhibition designs for the NSA Cryptologic Museum at its 
headquarters in Fort Meade, and his LinkedIn profile. Furthermore, 
Darchicourt was commissioned by Denny to create graphic rep-
resentations for what was labeled a New Zealand history project. 
The designer responded in style. Based on an iconic New Zealand 
reptile, he came up with a grinning cartoon lizard (or perhaps a 
lizard- eagle) with a camera- shaped eye apparatus, looking for 
prey— a kind of cyborg enhancement of the lizard.7
In the figure of Darchicourt, and through his design and his 
products, the installation presents a both comical and disturbing 
montage of the marriage of military gamer aesthetics, fantasy cul-
ture, disinformation, and libertarianism. It stages a meeting of sur-
veillance and business that is conducted online, through platforms 
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such as Behance, Freelancer, and Mechanical Turk— platforms that 
many (postdigital) artists use to commission material. Denny’s am-
bivalent fascination with new media entrepreneurs here arguably 
takes on a critical spin. Through the persona of the designer and 
his works, the exhibition relates the dark operations and imageries 
of state intelligence agencies to digital culture’s demand to become 
[Figure 2.4]. Simon Denny, Secret Power, installation view, Marciana Library, 2015. 
Photograph by Jens Ziehe.
45entrepreneurial selves. One of the board games on display is called 
Positive Press— Darchicourt is at home in different genres, if always 
with full- spectrum colors. The board game seeks to lead its young 
users from the “Down and Out Dump” to “Upbeat City,” where 
“YOU report the news in a positive way!” In Kraus’s words, “Positive 
Press is a lurid, disturbing game, simultaneously promoting the 
libertarian notion of ‘wellness’ and ‘happiness’ as healthy personal 
choices, and instructing primary school children in the rewards 
and production of ‘spin- control’ disinformation” (Kraus 2015, 24, 
emphasis original). Also on display: through Lifeskills Cardgames, 
today’s Crypto- Kids, the “future codemakers and codebreakers,” 
learn to “Dive into Social Networking” to become “Smart Sharks.” 
As Nigel Thrift (2011, 16n29) has remarked, the effects of what he 
calls the “security– entertainment complex” are most visible in a 
media- savvy pedagogy that seeks to “prepare[] the child for a world 
in which they will need to be able to present publicly, seek out data, 
and produce new kinds of significance about what it means to be 
a subject. They need to be not so much learners of determinate 
knowledge as little entrepreneurs of onflow.”
Organizing	the	Security–	Entertainment	 
Complex
If the kind of media- organizational nexus staged by Secret Power 
would need a speculative, generalized name, the one that comes to 
my mind is indeed the notion of the security– entertainment com-
plex. It denotes, writes Thrift (2011, 11), “an era of permanent and 
pervasive war and permanent and pervasive entertainment, both 
sharing the linked values of paranoiac vigilance and the correct 
identification of the potential of each moment.” The principle of 
persistent consumer and citizen surveillance in the name of securi-
ty and consumption would constitute “the heart of an authoritarian 
capitalism” that has emerged over the last twenty or thirty years 
(Thrift 2011, 12). This perpetual surveillance is closely connected to 
what, with Grégoire Chamayou’s (2015, 37– 45) Theory of the Drone, 
can be called the principles of “data fusion” (merging different 
46 layers of data into one form of information); of “the schematisation 
of forms of life” (a kind of cartography of life through data patterns 
and “pattern recognition”; see Apprich et al. 2018); of creating a 
total “archive or film of everyone’s life” (with the technologies of 
football broadcasting, or so Chamayou reports, seen as forerun-
ner); and of “preemptive anticipation,” according to which technol-
ogy figures out what consumers want before they know they want 
it, or where potential perpetrators, whose data coalesce into the 
wrong patterns, are hunted down before any wrongdoing might 
or might not happen. In similar terms, Shoshana Zuboff (2015) has 
focused on Google to identify the outlines of what she calls surveil-
lance capitalism, in which consumer anticipation is managed and 
modified by the predictive capacities of protocological control. This 
is what has turned Facebook “into the biggest surveillance- based 
enterprise in the history of mankind” (Lanchester 2017, 8).
Based on the ubiquity and availability of data as well as the means 
of information targeting and affective modulation, then, both se-
curity and entertainment sectors share the forms and outcomes of 
intelligence gathering, its research strategies and software codes. 
Agencies of state security and the behemoths of digital capitalism 
are the security– entertainment complex’s main organizational 
players. Yet the kind of organizational forces at play here work 
on different levels. The security– entertainment complex fuses 
different organizational scripts into an organizational complex. Ex-
panding on my reading of Products for Organizing and Secret Power’s 
organizational scripts, I distinguish between the three modes of 
protocological, bureaucratic, and entrepreneurial ordering.
First, the secret generation, mapping, and analysis of data is part 
of a new physics of organization. The corresponding property of 
organization and its forms of control and entrainment is software 
protocols. “Protocological organization” (Galloway 2011, 95) is “as 
real as pyramidal hierarchy, corporate bureaucracy, representative 
democracy, sovereign fiat, or any other principle of social and 
political control” (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 29). Protocological 
organization constitutes processes of organizing beyond and 
47across the boundaries of organizational entities and below the 
threshold of human perception. The organized world is con-
structed here through distributed networks that continually and 
autonomously produce and relate data— put into the informational 
forms of observations, classifications, profiles, evaluations, and 
predictions— according to a set of parameters yet otherwise largely 
devoid of human interference. As Friedrich Kittler (2006, 49) wrote, 
it is now “media technologies constructed on the basis of formal 
languages” that “move the boundary between the possible and the 
impossible, the thinkable and the unthinkable.” The corresponding 
regime of visibility and intelligibility, and the distribution of what 
can be perceived and expressed, takes the form of statistical or 
“algorithmic governance” (Rouvroy 2011). This is indeed a media 
a priori of contemporary sociotechnical ordering, and it is “so 
obvious that it seems to have drifted into the realm of the collective 
unconscious” (Lovink and Rossiter 2011, 280). While this modality 
of organizing might operate “flatly” and be spread out horizontally, 
to use Latour’s terms, it is by no means a symmetrical script where 
nonhuman, automated algorithms would meet human bodies on 
equal footing, in a merry dance of agencies. Principles of targeting, 
permanent watch, schematization, and preemptive anticipation are 
coded into these organizational scripts. In the sphere of con-
sumption, they help hold consumers “interidiotically stable” (Thrift 
2008, 12). In the sphere of infotainment, “controlled by a handful 
of governments and corporations,” they train citizens to become 
“village idiots” (Foster 2017, 75). In the world of labor, they seek to 
ensure docile employees and workers (Irani 2015). And employed 
in the militarized arms of the security– entertainment complex, they 
have deadly consequences (Chamayou 2015).
Second, this does not imply that conventional organizational 
entities and management styles disappear or necessarily lose 
influence. While there is some compelling evidence for the demise 
of the corporate form and the rise of platform- based, decentral-
ized, and project- based organizational formations (Davis 2013), the 
performativity of automated algorithms has become central for 
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Ninno 2014). Such analyses bolster David Graeber’s claim that far 
from reducing bureaucratic ordering, new information technologies 
and their logics of mapping, graphs, and codes help enact a kind of 
merger of public and private bureaucracies, ushering in an “era of 
total bureaucratization” (Graeber 2015, “Introduction”). Initiatives 
of so- called marketization or decentralization invariably lead to 
the expansion of bureaucratic ordering. Thinking organizationally, 
it is thus far from clear that practices of the social have now 
shifted away from formal organizational contexts and established 
institutions. Rather, the bureaucratic apparatuses of state security 
have adopted the technologies and imageries of networked 
organization to their own ends of surveillance and control. Just like 
social networking sites and platforms, they rely on apparatuses 
of capture that afford, to requote Thrift (2011, 11), the “linked 
values of paranoiac vigilance and the correct identification of the 
potential of each moment.” And not unlike, for instance, Facebook,8 
the employment of such technologies can take on a particularly 
perverse spin in the case of the NSA and its allies. The bureaucratic 
potential of algorithmic control is married to a keen insight into 
such technologies’ potential to enact and harness the deliberate 
modulation of affective states and the engineering of emotions. In 
this sense, bureaucratic forms like intelligence agencies have em-
braced the potential of new technologies without giving up on their 
modus operandi. They are turning into networked organizations so 
as to more pervasively perform “the multiple kinds of surveillance 
that populate everyday life” (Thrift 2011, 11).
Third, and following up on Graeber’s thesis, such technological– 
bureaucratic ordering (of tasks, bodies, and affects) is entangled 
with, rather than opposed to, the rise of the entrepreneurial 
subject (Bröckling 2016). After all, if more and more technologically 
enabled work relations seem to resemble some forms or imaginar-
ies of expressing one’s creative self, then this kind of flexibilized 
labor in turn does not diminish but places a greater demand on 
bureaucratic overview and control (Beyes and Metelmann 2018; 
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crossover between militaristic and entertainment styles embody 
the role of organized networks as new agents of entertainment 
and entrainment in the security– entertainment complex. Based 
on the comparably horizontal practices of networked organizing, a 
kind of mobile and entrepreneurial network sociality has emerged 
(Wittel 2001). To some degree, relationships can be organized 
unconstrained from price mechanisms or “traditional hierarchical 
models of social and economic organization” (Benkler 2006, 8). 
In critical terms, though, “the new spirit of capitalism is found 
in brainwork, self- measurement and self- fashioning, perpetual 
critique and innovation, data creation and extraction” (Galloway 
2014, 110). An entrepreneurialized subject or, as Denny’s installa-
tion seems to suggest, an artist of commodification is called forth. 
To some degree untied of the boundaries of conventional formal 
organizations, he or she combines work and play and aspires to 
be both individualistic and sociable, autonomous and embedded, 
responsible and adaptive, perpetually happy, target- driven, and, 
perhaps, deceitful (Gill 2011).9
Adopting yet slightly displacing Keller Easterling’s (2004) notion of 
“the new orgman,” it is tempting to read such a figure as the latest 
instantiation or an update of the “organization man,” William H. 
Whyte’s (1956) proverbial and stereotypical figure embedded in, 
and dutifully loyal to, the postwar corporation. In Secret Power, 
the designer and former NSA creative director cuts a both scary 
and comical figure, cheerfully overidentifying with the libertarian 
and cruel world of the security– entertainment complex, just as 
Whyte’s organization man presumably overidentified with the 
corporation. Yet in situating this figure as pivotal to the rise of the 
organizational complex that fed the military– industrial complex, 
indeed, as its cyborg, Reinhold Martin (2003) has shown how the 
organization man’s combined conformism and individuality as well 
as modularity and flexibility already helped prepare the ground 
for unfettered commercialization and consumption. If the entre-
preneurial cyborg of the security– entertainment complex presents 
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in logistics, flogging styles of management and protocols for 
networking, as Easterling (2004) writes. In more general terms, 
the organization man’s “powers have multiplied even if [or just 
because] his ‘mind and soul’ is no longer exclusively beholden to 
the demands of The Organization” (Lovink and Rossiter 2011, 280). 
The Orgmen are embedded in and tied to the life of networks (and 
their modes of bureaucratic and affective control); they are molded 
and modulated by contemporary media technologies. They have 
partly been made redundant by protocological organizing and 
automated governance, and they increasingly embrace a datafied, 
platform- based version of acting “as if they were all entrepreneurs” 
(Denny and Obrist 2016).
In this sense, the security– entertainment complex brings with 
it its own updated organizational nexus. This nexus shapes and 
is shaped by pervasive and ubiquitous digital technologies. It is 
geared toward permanent surveillance of citizens and consumers 
and its corollaries of preemptive anticipation and affective modu-
lation. It cannot be reduced to either a logic of entrepreneurialism, 
or one of bureaucratization, or one of purely algorithmic control. 
Rather, the organizational nexus of the security– entertainment 
complex coalesces around modes of protocological, bureaucratic, 
and entrepreneurial orderings and their entanglements.
The	Undemocratic	Surround
As a way of pulling these strings together, I think that Denny’s 
immersive installation can also be understood as an inversion of 
what Fred Turner (2013) has called the “democratic surround”: the 
emergence of multimedia environments as forms of democratic 
communication in the United States. Developed during World 
War II by state agencies, intellectuals, and artists, the democratic 
surround was designed to support the molding of the “new man” 
as a democratic citizen who would weather the detrimental au-
thoritarian effects of the mass media, as demonstrated in fascist 
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mass media with multimedia environments, or so it was hoped, 
would allow emancipated spectators to integrate a heterogeneous 
variety of sense perceptions into individual acts of sensemaking. 
Such immersive experience would resemble the political process 
of finding one’s way in a diverse and complex society, and it would 
train the subject in partaking in it, even embracing it. Idea and 
practice of the democratic surround would later bleed into the 
counterculture and the multimedia utopianism of the 1960s and 
their experiments to expand human consciousness and foster 
a sense of belonging to human collectivity. In this sense, Turner 
(2013, 9) argues, “the democratic surround was not only a way 
of organizing images and sounds; it was a way of thinking about 
organizing society.” As such, it not only represented a genuinely 
democratic impulse. It also came to be invested with what Turner 
calls a “managerial mode of a control: a mode in which people 
might be free to choose their experiences, but only from a menu 
written by experts” (6).
If this instrumental vision of expert control and leadership (of what 
the population should think and feel) has come to haunt contem-
porary sociotechnical life, as Turner suggests, then Secret Power’s 
postdigital assemblage presents an update of the relation between 
art, organization, and social transformation. Yet any democratic 
or emancipatory vision seems to have been purged. In today’s 
organizational complex, the democratic surround has become 
a security– entertainment surround, and the new man a new 
org(wo)man. This surround is produced through different modal-
ities of organization: scripts of invisible protocological organizing 
that are built to identify, classify, and sometimes taint or destroy 
human beings; networked organizations and organized networks 
as transformed or new forms of organization that increasingly rely 
on technical media as means of modulation and control; and a net-
worked, horizontal mode of organizing entrepreneurial subjects, 
little entrepreneurs of onflow.
52 Can	the	Security–	Entertainment	Complex	 
Be	Represented?
The notion of surround also relates to the problem of how to 
research and represent today’s invasive media and their partly 
invisible and partly preconscious— or nonconscious, to use Hayles’s 
term— operations. How to render the organizational complex, if 
it is to some degree predicated on what seems beyond or before 
representation? How to write organization? On one hand, it 
seems a commonplace to point out that much of what was once 
regarded as the domain of social science, namely, generating and 
analyzing data, and thus an increasing part of the output of what 
was formerly carried out by social researchers— surveys, ques-
tionnaires, interviews, and so on— is now primarily in the hands 
of the security– entertainment complex, that is, agencies of state 
and, of course, Google, Facebook, and the like. In what amounts to 
a kind of perverse success story of scholarly inventions that have 
bypassed their inventors, we have arrived at a “new form of medi-
ology in which the details of the everyday life of millions of people 
are . . . uploaded and analysed” (Thrift 2011, 10). Yet this kind of 
mediology is invisible to and unattainable for public scholarship. In 
a memorable turn of phrase, Galloway (2014, 127) has spoken of 
the subsequent emergence of “low- agency scholars,” researchers 
unable to make numerically valid statements extracted from ade-
quate measurement devices and data sets.
On the other hand, there is the question of representation itself. In 
a text titled “Are Some Things Unrepresentable?,” Galloway (2011) 
has dwelled on Jacques Rancière’s (2007) critique of the trope of 
unrepresentability in an earlier text of the same title. Because 
data have no visual form, Galloway argues, it is on the level of 
data’s translation into information where visualization takes place. 
However, depictions of information networks would all look the 
same; they would adhere to a uniform set of aesthetic codes. There 
thus would not be a proper poetics of information networks able to 
render today’s societies of control and its organizational forces.
53I wonder, though, whether Secret Power does not offer a response 
to what low- agency scholars can do, and to representing contem-
porary social ordering. According to Anna Munster (2013), what in 
this text is called protocological organization works imminently or  
intensively beyond perception (through data fusion, data mining, 
and pattern recognition) and extensively through relations with 
other social and technical elements. The symbolic and representa-
tional level can therefore be seen as secondary, subordinated. In 
this sense, it is on this subordinate level where Denny’s assemblage 
of hardware, images, objects, texts, and sculptural renderings 
cohere. These are thus works neither of media genealogy nor 
of media ecology (Kraus 2015, 20), nor are they experiments in 
“data undermining,” to use Munster’s (2013, “Data Undermining”) 
term. Denny does not engage with, for instance, countermapping 
networks or writing “counterprotocological” code. As noted, he 
engages in a kind of anthropology of media culture that assembles, 
remediates, and reorganizes elements of orgware into the different 
context of art spaces. What appears is a mimesis of what is given 
to sensory perception in the form of orgart. And Denny becomes 
an artistic orgman, mimetically reproducing and amplifying 
issues of connectivity, networking protocols, and corresponding 
management styles. There thus is some ambivalence to Denny’s 
work— perhaps a “strategic ambivalence” (Byrt 2016, “No Place to 
Hide”) that itself becomes part of the artworks.10 More than “just 
showing,” Denny amplifies and reinterprets, connects and juxtapos-
es, the found material. It is thus a practice of “mimetic exacerba-
tion” that can veer toward what Hal Foster (2017, 95), with a nod 
to the art of Jeff Koons, calls “an affirmation, even celebration, of 
the capitalist garbage bucket.” Yet through its thematic, visual, and 
iconographic assembly, the work provokes reflections on the inter-
relations of what is on display— such as identifying different scripts 
of organizing. It is through gathering, alienating, and juxtaposing 
material into a different context, then, that different organizational 
scripts and their interrelations become manifest. It allows the 
visitor to think back, as it were, to the new physics of organization 
underneath of what is given to the human sensorium, to its 
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ordering, affective control, and entrepreneurial selves.
The “undemocratic surround” of Secret Power also invites consider-
ations of the practice of ordering and of tracing connections itself. 
It performs an act of “reverse espionage” (Higgins 2015), of intelli-
gence gathering and data fusion. Consider the speculative portrait 
of Darchicourt constructed through the designer’s work, his traces 
online, and the leaked material as well as visually merging the 
designer’s freelance material with the visual language employed by 
the intelligence agencies. As a visitor, then, one engages in one’s 
very own, pedestrian, perhaps intelligence agency– like trawling 
through data and imagery, trying to connect dots and recognize 
patterns. It is a strangely seductive and uncanny exercise. Drifting 
through the exhibition, my experience was slowed down, rerouted, 
and opened to processes of association. This way, the imaginary, 
imagery, and styles of an organizational nexus that underpins the 
security– entertainment complex take on an evocative visibility and 
palpability.
Through an applied methodology of thinking organizationally, this 
kind of artistic research therefore posits a possible case of what 
the low- agency scholars, denuded of access to the data masses 
and the tools to analyze them, can do. Thrift (2011, 19) calls this the 
enactment of “cultural probes that can help people to rework the 
world by suggesting new unorientations rather than correctives”— 
 a research labor of “suggestion, curiosity and wondering” (18). 
Secret Power posits organization as a preposition and urges the 
spectator to trace and connect scripts of organizing and being or-
ganized. In the wake of these scripts, to paraphrase Latour (2013a, 
390), something of organization is left, and it does not look pretty.
In	Conclusion:	Speaking	Organizationally
This essay has dwelled on the question of thinking organizationally 
in the contemporary landscape of media- technological ordering. 
Intrigued by Simon Denny’s installations Products for Organizing 
55and Secret Power and their mimetic aggravations of orgware, I 
have discussed different modes of organization: protocological, 
bureaucratic, and entrepreneurial processes of ordering contem-
porary life. Yet these processes aren’t mutually exclusive. They 
intermingle and cohere into a contemporary nexus of sociotech-
nical organization that can be understood as a manifestation and 
extension of the security– entertainment complex. For sure, there 
is no single logic governing the organizing of algorithms (Neyland 
2015), just as there is no single mode of ordering in organizational 
settings. Consider for instance the financial markets and algorith-
mic or computerized high- frequency trading, the consequences 
of which might slip off the radar of the generalized notion of the 
security– entertainment complex. But then, tracing multiple scripts 
of organizing and the way they interrelate and might cohere is 
precisely what is required.
“Why do we still talk about organization in an era that seems to 
celebrate looseness and non- commitment?” Lovink and Rossiter 
(2011, 280) ask. Because the celebration of looseness and non-
commitment does not equal the absence of organization but 
indicates the transformation of organizational scripts, perhaps 
the emergence of a new organizational complex. Lovink and 
Rossiter’s focus falls on orgnets, organized networks and their 
potential to invent and establish new— emancipatory, progressive, 
transgressive— institutional forms. In similar terms, Rodrigo Nunes 
(2014) has outlined the notion of network- movement to think 
present- day organizing beyond formal organization— The Organisa-
tion of the Organisationless as not the absence of but a new mode 
of organization. After all, postdigital societies are not only a field of 
advanced techniques and strategies of manipulation, surveillance, 
and control. They still, one hopes, offer “plenty of opportunities for 
experimentation with political tactics and forms of organization” 
(Terranova 2004, 154).
However, it is not only net activism that “puts the Organization 
Question on the table” (Lovink 2016, “Occupy”). Another way of 
putting this is that networked forms of organizing are not the other 
56 to management and managerial domination, as Denny, tongue per-
haps firmly placed in cheek, demonstrates so well. They might be 
cut from the same media- technological cloth. Indeed, “everyone is 
organizing” (Lovink and Rossiter 2011, 281). But then, there is a mir-
ror and equally valid apodictic claim: everyone is being organized. 
The very same technologies that enable or perhaps condition new 
forms of relating and cooperating, indeed, the same scripts of 
ordering enabled or conditioned by such technologies, now con-
stitute the heart and the intelligence of a security– entertainment 
complex in thrall to paranoiac watchfulness, to the surveillance, 
targeting, and affective control of consumers and citizens. In 
other words, contemporary organization is immanent to today’s 
media- technological apparatuses just as much as it is their driving 
force. This is what is at stake when the term organize is mobilized 
in search of media, and why it is again time to think and speak 
organizationally.
Notes
 1 In addition, Secret Power made use of a second venue: the arrivals lounge of 
Venice’s Marco Polo Airport on the mainland, a contemporary space of transit 
and global security, where travelers are processed and monitored so as to 
enter EU territory. Here two photographic reproductions of the Library’s ceiling 
and walls adorn the floor and the walls of the transit space. The juxtaposition 
of a “classic” site of power and knowledge with their contemporary manifes-
tation is therefore inversed: a contemporary site of monitoring is invaded 
by depictions of Renaissance allegories. What might come across as a visual 
promotion for what’s on in the Library (and hence for the artwork itself) takes 
on further meanings only in relation to the installation at the Biblioteca. After 
all, as Chris Kraus remarks, Marco Polo Airport was the world’s first airport 
to employ digital surveillance and electronic access control (Kraus 2015), and 
Snowden stayed for forty days in the transit lounge of Moscow’s Sheremetyevo 
International Airport (where he read Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, or so 
it was reported; Luhn 2013).
 2 Such works include All You Need Is Data: The DLD Conference (2012), a kind of 
twisted group portrait of movers and shakers of the digital economy; The Per-
sonal Effects of Kim Dotcom (2013), a re- creation and reimagination of the confis-
cated items of the notorious internet entrepreneur, which includes a collection 
of rather terrible works of art; New Management (2014), a study of Samsung 
manuals, training materials, and corporate reliquaries; Disruptive Berlin (2014), 
57sculptural portraits of ten young media companies; Products for Organising, 
an inquiry into the organizational logics that drive hacker communities and 
“proper” formalized organizations (see later); and Real Mass Entrepreneurship 
(2017), based on an investigation of small- firm technology production as mass 
phenomenon in Shenzen.
 3 In this recursive sense, “media are not only the conditions of possibility for 
events— be they the transfer of a message, the emergence of a visual object, or 
the re- presentation of things past— but are in themselves events: assemblages 
or constellations of certain technologies, fields of knowledge, and social institu-
tions” (Horn 2007a, 8).
 4 Latour endorses a “process- theoretical” approach to the study of organiza-
tion. This entails a shift from understanding organizations as bounded, stable 
entities (the corporation, the nonprofit organization, etc.) and their presumed 
properties to a focus on the “goings- on” of organizing. Such adverbial or ge-
rundial thinking of organizing seems especially pertinent to changing organiza-
tional constellations that are enabled by and accompany media- technological 
transformations (Beyes 2017).
 5 In this modified understanding, scripts resemble what fellow erstwhile ANT 
scholar John Law called “modes of ordering” (Law 1994). Latour’s theatrical 
notion of scripts emphasizes a kind of Goffmanesque role- shifting, as organiza-
tional actors are sequentially scripting and being scripted in different capacities 
and engagements. This resembles a primarily temporal description of orga-
nizational role- playing, which now includes the capacity to work on the script 
itself. As such, the concept remains aspatial and atechnological (there seem 
to be no automated protocols in Latour’s scripts). Law’s notion of “modes of 
ordering” emphasizes the modes’ or scripts’ simultaneous multiplicity (and thus 
spatiality), their “strategic” effects (and thus power) as well as the technological 
configuration of these “material- semiotic” forces. It is in this sense that I first 
identify organizational scripts in Denny’s work, before turning to contemporary 
modes of sociotechnical ordering.
 6 As Georg Simmel pointed out, formal organization epitomizes the social form 
of the secret as “consciously willed concealment” (Simmel 1906, 449). In in-
telligence agencies, this willed concealment is doubled: a constitutive part of 
organizational life and the organizations’ raison d’être (Horn 2007b). And with 
regard to bureaucratic power, Max Weber argued that it is in the “material na-
ture” of every bureaucracy to keep its knowledge and intentions secret (Weber 
1946, 233).
 7 In a little scoop, a journalist from the Guardian contacted Darchicourt after she 
had interviewed Denny about the exhibition at the start of the Biennale: “While 
surprised, he was sanguine about the use of his work in the exhibition. ‘I sell 
my work and I tend not to keep track of it,’ he said. He added: ‘I view myself as 
an Eskimo. They’d do their drawings on pieces of bone, and leave them in their 
campsites when they left. That’s what I do. I was paid very well to do the work 
[for Venice] and David Bennewith was great to work with. As long as I have 
credit for my work I am happy’” (Higgins 2015).
58  8 In 2014, a study on “Experimental Evidence of Massive- Scale Emotional Conta-
gion through Social Networks” caused a minor scandal. Coauthored by a Face-
book researcher, the study discussed an experiment on nearly seven hundred 
thousand Facebook users (without their awareness) that entailed the purpose-
ful manipulation of newsfeeds to find out if and how moods are transferred 
and travel across social networks (Kramer et al. 2014). Facebook, after all, is 
primarily in the advertising and surveillance business, which in a postdigital 
world relies on algorithmic practices of targeting, permanent watch, schemati-
zation, preemptive anticipation— and the modulation of moods.
 9 In his reflections on The Uberfication of the University, Gary Hall quotes a futurol-
ogist who nicely (if probably inadvertently) captures the security– entertainment 
complex at work organizationally: “You might be driving Uber part of the day, 
renting out your spare bedroom a little bit, renting out space in your closet as 
storage for Amazon or housing the drones that does [sic] delivery for Amazon” 
(Hall 2016, 9).
10 “Consequently, I have never been able to entirely figure out whether he is a 
critic of the corporate neoliberalism that provides him with so much of his sub-
ject matter, or an artist deeply embedded with, and beholden to, that system” 
(Byrt 2016, “No Place to Hide”). As Byrt shows, departing from a clear- cut op-
position between critique and affirmation might be a flawed or nonproductive 
way to engage with this kind of work. It seems to make more sense to ponder 
Secret Power’s “mimetic exercabation” (Foster 2017, 95) in terms of its potential 
as immanent critique of, in my reading, the security– entertainment complex.
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Organization Is the 
Message:	Gray	Media
Lisa Conrad
Epistemic	Things
The concepts of media and organization are quite diffuse. This 
should not however be seen as a lack. Rather, they resemble 
“epistemic things” (Rheinberger 1997, 28). Situated between phe-
nomenon and concept, they are what one does not yet know. Their 
irreducible vagueness carries the activity of research forward. So, 
what would happen if one would relate media and organization? 
More diffuseness and complexity, for sure. Yet, three distinct fields 
of inquiry or ways of seeing take shape. First, there is an organiza-
tional definition of media: they are the things that organize. This 
idea is mostly news to organization studies but not to media stud-
ies. The organizational understanding of media has been around 
for a long time; it has even helped shape the discipline’s identity. 
Second, the question arises of how media are organized. How do 
institutions, conventions, power structures, and broader techno-
logical environments shape “the things that organize”? Here media 
are not understood as cohesive and self- contained but rather as 
entangled with their concrete settings of use and application— with 
their habitats. Third, a normative question appears that scrutinizes 
what it means for media to be well organized. In search of media 
and in terms of media, what is a good organization? While perhaps 
64 an unanswerable question, it raises the unavoidable issue of the 
“task of governance” (Rossiter 2006, 17).
To unpack these three approaches, and what they allow us to 
see, implies drawing on the fields of media studies, organization 
studies, science and technology studies, information systems 
research, and business history. Complementing and materializing 
this discussion, perhaps like an empirical test- bed of some of the 
claims extracted from the literature, I will weave in descriptions 
of, and reflections on, the phenomenon of enterprise resource 
planning software (ERP). Considering media in the context of 
formal (or traditional) organizations leads more or less inevitably 
to enterprise software. Over the past thirty years, these software 
packages have emerged as the new standard infrastructure of 
organization and administration. They are a paradigmatic example 
of gray media, a term Mathew Fuller and Andrew Goffey (2012, 1) 
use for those unremarkable media “most recognizable from the 
world of work and administration,” such as databases, accounting 
records, forms, and planning tools. Today ERP and related software 
packages are crucial media of organizing, and we are in the middle 
of witnessing the reconfigurations that this will bring about.
Things That Organize
lisa conrad: I always find it awful to get acquainted with 
a new computer program. . . . It takes time. . . . 
mrs. j.: I also dreaded Infor [enterprise software] back 
then. . . . Something new again, oh dear . . . but actually, 
it was easier than I had imagined. This is also what I’m 
thinking now [with the upcoming introduction of SAP]. 
Why shouldn’t it work? . . . 
lc.: Sure. And there are also some kinds of parallel sys-
tems, so it does not all depend on SAP. If SAP sort of— 
j: Drops out?
lc: Yes, then you can still— 
65j: Then I can still— well I wouldn’t be able to do any pro-
duction orders. I could . . . without the system I couldn’t 
do anything. No, I couldn’t do an order, because without 
Infor or without SAP it isn’t working. . . . I don’t know. Well, 
you cannot imagine the world without system anymore. 
It doesn’t work. No. Back to the work folder, that doesn’t 
work.
This conversation1 between J. and me quite literally deals with 
the technological condition of organizing. We are encountering 
media theory’s central thesis not between dusty book covers but 
in the real world and in action. Without the system, you “couldn’t 
do anything.” Going back to work folders is hard to imagine. The 
processes of organizing are entirely enmeshed with networked 
computers running on a common database, with workstations on 
every desk displaying an interface for data entry and with every 
newly entered piece of data turning into the informational base 
of all the other workstations in real time. It is not conceivable, but 
also not feasible, to work beyond this infrastructure. The account 
should not be taken as an isolated, peculiar case. Extending from 
their base in manufacturing, ERP systems have been adopted in 
almost every productive and service sector (Pollock and Williams 
2009). Today it would be difficult to find a company with more 
than twenty employees that does not utilize some kind of business 
software to manage stock, staff, customers, orders, processes, and 
finance. The public sector, too, is widely equipped with software 
packages stemming from private providers (Pollock and Williams 
2009, 3). ERP systems are on the brink of turning into “mature 
technological systems”— ordinary, unremarkable, and unlikely to 
prompt wonder or inquiry (Edwards 2003, 185). They have become 
everyday infrastructures.
Formal (or traditional) organizations and digital technologies are 
thus thoroughly interlaced (e.g., Zuboff 1988; Orlikowski and Scott 
2008; Conrad 2017). Mrs. J. says, “Without the system I couldn’t  
do anything. No, I couldn’t do an order, because without Infor or  
66 without SAP it isn’t working.” This kind of dependence is, of 
course, not new. Previous forms of organization emerged from 
and depended on paper (e.g., Kafka 2012; Hull 2012; Vismann 
2008; Siegert 2006). Now networked computers equipped with 
enterprise- wide software are the central and standard means of 
organizing. “Back to the work folder, that doesn’t work.” There 
are numerous providers of these software packages, the biggest 
of which are Oracle, Microsoft, Infor, and SAP. However, SAP 
(Systems, Applications, Products in Data Processing) is widely 
recognized as dominating the market. Founded by five former IBM 
engineers from Mannheim, Germany, in 1972, SAP has become the 
new sap of organizational life, its vital force. SAP’s most successful 
software products, R/2 and R/3, have defined what ERP software 
is and should do. The SAP chroniclers Ludwig Siegele and Joachim 
Zepelin (2009, 33) argue that SAP’s software packages— creating 
new structures of organizational perception and action— have 
shaped the recent phase of economic and logistical globalization. 
The authors propose an analogy to double- entry bookkeeping: it 
has never been merely a tool of documenting what goes on in an 
organization, but it profoundly transformed businesses as well as 
the economy as a whole (cf. Quattrone and Puyou, forthcoming). 
In the same way, ERP systems have significantly intervened into the 
way global businesses run and interact with each other (Siegele 
and Zepelin 2009, 29).2 “The best- run businesses run SAP,” as one 
of the company’s advertising campaigns has claimed.
How is the field of organization studies responding to this 
profound infrastructural shift in the setup of organizing? There is 
a dispersed stream of research that is interested in the “stuff” of 
organization. It looks at the intertwining of organizational practices 
and the technological infrastructures businesses rely on. In a 
short text on “Organizing as a Mode of Existence,” Bruno Latour 
condenses many of these arguments that have been made in the 
tradition of ethnomethodology, practice theory, pragmatism, and 
process philosophy. The text acknowledges the “mass of work” that 
has been done in organization studies to complicate and rede-
67scribe notions of organization (Latour 2013, 47).3 One of the crucial 
points that Latour carves out is the idea to conceive of organiza-
tions as “always immanent to the instrumentarium that brings them 
into existence” (49, emphasis original). “There is no inertia at all 
in an organization. But if you stop carrying it along: it drops dead” 
(41). Accordingly, carrying out an organization means translating 
it, hence taking it from one moment to the next. It is this focus on 
the “tiny transcendence” (50) that leads to “the precise tools that 
allow the organization to shift from one sequence . . . to the next” 
(47, emphasis original). He lists writing devices, organizational 
speech acts, instruments of accounting, and auditing as examples 
for “those humble tools” on which organizational work relies (48).4 
Thus Latour points to an emerging definition of organizing ensuing 
from its means. Starting from concrete and “tiny” practices of or-
ganizing, this understanding conceives of organizational practices 
as being inseparable from their material and technological means. 
They are not independent of their instruments, of their carrier 
media, neither today nor in the past. What we are able to do and 
what we can imagine doing is “immanent” to the characteristics of 
the tools at hand.5
To media studies, this line of argumentation is nothing new. The 
intimate connection between technological infrastructures and 
organization is a focal point of media studies. In fact, organization 
would be a quite suitable term to define media studies’ central 
and identificatory concept, as John Durham Peters (2015) has 
recently demonstrated. His book The Marvelous Clouds starts with 
an elaboration of the “intellectual landscape” leading to the media 
concept that is crucial to the book’s argument and that reaches 
“beyond messages to habitats” (14– 15). Further outlining this 
“expanded sense of the media concept,” he describes media as 
“vessels and environments, containers of possibility that anchor 
our existence and make what we are doing possible” (1– 2). With 
recourse to Elihu Katz, Peters chooses “organization” to elaborate 
on this. According to Katz (1987, 30), there are three paradigms 
within media and communications research, namely, information, 
68 ideology, and organization. Information is concerned with media 
as means of “transmitting information in a political system” (27). 
Ideology, alternatively, deals with the hegemony of certain media 
outlets as well as with practices of resistance to them. Last but not 
least, organization occupies “the more elementary idea that the 
essential attributes that characterize a predominant medium might 
affect social order, or, in other words, that the media may tell us 
both how to think and how to organize” (29). In this paradigm, the 
effects of media are considered to be “on organization— empire, 
market, science, church” (30).
For Peters (2015, 17), “Katz’s diagnosis helps to show the edge 
space in which this book sits, namely, the third or technological 
tradition.” This realm, Peters continues, has been developed 
by a range of different scholars, such as Lewis Mumford, James 
Carey, Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, André Leroi- Gourhan, 
Friedrich Kittler, and Bruno Latour (18). Even though “not all of 
[them] recognize ‘media’ as their central theme,” they nevertheless 
have contributed to an understanding of media as “civilizational 
ordering devices” (5), “fundamental constituents of organization” 
(19), or “materials to manage time, space and power” (20). To these 
researchers, organization is the main effect of media. But maybe 
it makes sense to put it the other way around and claim that it 
is these scholars’ interest in matters of organization that has led 
them to media. This would then point to an organizational defini-
tion of media. It is the capacity to order, to manage, to arrange, to 
structure, and so on, that turns an object into a medium.
The work of Harold Innis and its strong ties to the social and 
economic sciences encapsulates such an organizational definition 
of media. Indeed, throughout his career, Innis remained “faithful 
to his political economy origin” (Drache 1995, xiv). From the 1920s 
on, Innis was employed at the University of Toronto, where he 
later met and collaborated with Marshall McLuhan. He studied 
the history of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Innis 1923), fur trade 
(Innis 1930), and cod fishery (Innis 1940) in Canada.6 In the course 
of this, he developed an explanation of the economic development 
69of Canada that links it to its staples and basic goods, which are, in 
their turn, linked to the character of the landscape. For instance, 
“extensive waterways and the dominant Pre- Cambrian formation” 
provide the conditions for collecting furs in the northern regions 
and transporting them to the centers of trade (Innis 1950, 3; Innis 
1930). He concludes that the character of the landscape, dominant 
staples, transportation systems, and means of communication 
crucially shape the specific development of states and societies. 
As if to test this argument, Innis then begins to devote himself to 
historic empires— especially their rise and fall— and how they relate 
to transformations in the material and technological environments. 
Empire and Communications (Innis 1950) traces stone, clay, parch-
ment, papyrus, the alphabet, and paper in ancient Egypt, Babylo-
nia, Mesopotamia, and medieval Europe but also the emergence of 
mass media from the fifteenth century on, such as printed books, 
newspapers, and, eventually, radio.
Innis’s work is often received as consisting of two phases. The first 
phase is associated with his exploration of Canadian economic 
history and the development of the so- called staples approach. 
The second phase, starting with Empire and Communications, is 
considered as providing contributions to the theory of media and 
communication. But “to think that the later Innis was concerned 
strictly with cultural issues while the early Innis of the staples was 
narrowly focused on economic development is plainly wrong,” 
stresses Daniel Drache (1995, xl), who revived and reframed the 
reception of Innis’s work in the 1990s. Quite the contrary, it can be 
argued that throughout his career, Innis was interested in ques-
tions of organization. This is what unites his objects of research: 
waterways, natural resources, basic goods, trading routes, 
means of transport, means of communication, and practices of 
administration— they organize commercial and labor relations, 
social and political institutions, and cultural conventions. Each is 
an “organizing mechanism” (Drache 1995, xlv) generating different 
configurations of resources, people, knowledge, and power. Hence 
Innis is concerned with the connection between the way certain 
70 regions, cities, states, or empires are organized and the material 
features of those things that afford transport, exchange, overview, 
coordination, control, and so on. For “those things” he uses the 
term media. Therefore, to Innis, media are not only that which 
organize the mass democracies and consumer societies of the 
twentieth century but also that which organize early civilizations, 
antique city- states, medieval Christianity, the Industrial Revolution, 
or the Canadian economy. This means that an organizational 
definition of media includes “classic” mass media (e.g., newspaper, 
radio), gray media used in administration and business (e.g., 
stone tablets, papyrus, paper), and elemental media (e.g., rivers, 
mountains, valleys) alike (Peters 2015).7
In the reception of the Toronto School of Communication, Innis 
has taken on the role of Marshall McLuhan’s boring older brother. 
However, the basic anchors of McLuhan’s media theory “had 
already been developed, as McLuhan admitted, in the writings . . . 
of Innis” (Pooley 2016). These are the focus on carrier media 
instead of messages, the concentration on “the character of the 
material, particularly its relative permanence” (Innis 1950, 6), but 
also the vanishing point of social organization, a term both scholars 
use. For McLuhan ([1964] 1994, 8), the criterion to consider an 
artifact as a medium is the “change of scale or pace or pattern that 
it introduces.” With The Gutenberg Galaxy, he explicitly undertakes 
“a study of the divergent nature of oral and written social organi-
zation” (McLuhan [1962] 2002, 1). He claims that new dominant 
media cause a reconfiguration of perception and cognition. Via this 
twist of “the kaleidoscope of the entire sensorium” (55), media have 
significant effects on the organization of social life. For instance, 
before writing, there is an “intense stress on auditory organiza-
tion of all experience” (24). Nonliterate societies— he describes 
them as gossipy, entranced, and obsessed with magic— are “the 
product of speech, drum and ear technologies” (8). Writing and 
printing, conversely, bring about a sociality that is structured 
by centralism, individualism, commercial spirit, and powerful 
scientific institutions. Eventually, Friedrich Kittler (1999)— working 
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“[media] determine our situation” (xxxix). In Kittler’s writings, the 
primal interest in media as effectors of organization is carried on. 
Focusing on technical media in relation to cultural production, such 
as literature and music, he follows the poststructuralist program of 
questioning knowledge and truth.
McLuhan ([1964] 1994, 7) coined the slogan “the medium is the 
message.” The cybernetician Norbert Wiener ([1950] 1989), on 
the other hand, titled one of his chapters “Organization as the 
Message.”8 Looking at these statements from the perspective of  
the organizational stream of media studies, they seem to be saying 
the same thing. It could be paraphrased as “the medium is organi-
zation and organization is the message.” Research on cybernetics 
serves as a fruitful example to show where the organizational 
stream of media studies has been heading in the recent decades 
(e.g., Pias 2003; Hagner and Hörl 2008; Peters 2016). Cybernetics 
can be described as a 1950s- universalist scientific project but also 
as a powerful utopian narrative that inspired the application of 
its ideas in various fields of practice (Medina 2011; Kline 2015). 
Though the definitions are manifold, cybernetics developed 
a model of thinking (and designing) that revolves around the 
principle that machines/organisms/humans receive information 
from the environment, which then effects a regulation of behavior 
so as to adapt to the environment. These information- feedback 
loops are assumed to be at work in all kinds of systems— physical, 
biological, technological, and social. Hence the universalist claims 
of cybernetics. It carries the promise of explaining, but potentially 
also regulating and controlling, the behaviors of these systems.
Ronald Kline (2015, 6) considers cybernetic thinking as coevolving 
with the development of the first digital computers during that 
period of time. He relates the “cybernetic craze” of the 1950s— the 
unexpected popularity of its models and terms— to “a lively public 
discourse about the changing relationship between humans and 
machines, a discourse stimulated by the invention of electronic 
computers” (69). There was an enthusiasm about “some fantastic 
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(Boulanger, cited in Kline 2015, 7), but there were also worries 
about a sweeping automation that would lead to “devaluing 
brains in industry,” as a newspaper headline has put it (Kline 
2015, 71). Thus cybernetics— the science, the applications, and the 
fantasies— are part of an atmosphere of coming to grips with a new 
generation of machines “creating a new economic and social order” 
(5). By now, sixty years later, it has become common sense that 
ubiquitous networked computing technologies are triggering new 
value- creation chains, new business models, new divisions of labor, 
new forms of exploitation, new forms of governance, of activism, of 
criminality, and so on— in short, a new organization of life. Perhaps 
it is accurate to speak of a “process of cybernetization of all modes 
of existence” (Hörl 2016, 26). More and more areas of life are 
permeated and reorganized through networked computer systems. 
Wherever possible, computer- based information- feedback systems 
are applied to regulate flows of supply and demand by aggregating 
data, signaling capacities or constraints, and prompting appropri-
ate reactions.
Thus the organizational stream of media studies that developed 
and established a concept of media as being fundamentally related 
to issues of organization has been around for a long time. In this 
sense, we could even consider the genealogy of media thinking 
as shaped by organization. Media scholars continue to scrutinize 
the things that organize. Exploring the way media create certain 
patterns of organization and how the lens of organization defines 
what we consider to be a medium is the first line of inquiry 
exposed by the relation between media and organization. It is a 
defining and strongly resonating feature of media research.
Media Are Organized
The second field of inquiry that the relation of media and orga-
nization carries with it complicates the first one. Media organize, 
but they are, in turn, also organized. This field draws on an under-
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certain forms of organization but rather as messily interlaced with 
social institutions as well as all sorts of other media. It can be found 
within the aforementioned organizational stream of media studies 
(e.g., Vogl 2007), but especially in more recent social science (and 
STS) inflected research projects (e.g., de Laet and Mol 2000). Thus 
the focus does not lie on causal effects but rather on “assemblages 
or constellations of certain technologies, fields of knowledge, and 
social institutions” (Horn 2007, 8). These constellations are always 
on the move, so to say, with every part constantly shaping and 
being shaped by all the others. By now there is, for instance, a real 
substream of research looking at the way literary genres, concepts 
of authorship, and the copyrights form and are formed by paper, 
handwriting, or word processing software (e.g., Siegert 1999; Dom-
mann 2014; Gitelman 2014; Tenen 2017). Interestingly, also Harold 
Innis, whom I presented as standing for the position stressing the 
organizational capacities of media, can be cited as being aware 
of media’s organizedness through social institutions. His staples 
approach comprises the idea that a geographic and economic area 
is rarely untouched by some prior “social framework that organized 
land, labour, and capital” (Drache 1995, xix). There are old elites, 
social conventions, and different cultural backgrounds interacting 
with the less social structures, such as the character of the land 
and its principal trading commodities. To carve out this less linear 
and less causal understanding of media’s relation to organization, I 
will first come back to the case of business software— the example 
this text has started out with. I will then move on to the work of 
other scholars who have sketched and stressed the organizedness 
of media.
Already when taking a very broad historical perspective on the 
integration of computing technologies into the world of business,  
a mutual molding and a mutual organizing become evident. Ever 
since tinkerers and inventors came up with electromechanical com-
puting technologies toward the end of the nineteenth century— 
such as Herman Hollerith with the punched- card tabulator— these 
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were made in a way to swiftly enter the field of private and public 
organizations (e.g., Yates 2000; Heide 2009). Historians of busi-
ness and technology have shown how information technology 
providers and user industries interacted with and pressured each 
other. On one hand, companies synchronized their processes as 
well as their products or services to the technological capacities 
available. On the other hand, research and development efforts 
of the technology companies were oriented toward application 
in corporate contexts. For instance, Yates gives an account of 
U.S. insurance companies being among the first organizations to 
integrate punched- card technology (from about 1910 onward). 
By the 1950s, the insurances’ actuarial calculating practices as 
well as many of their business practices, such as billing, run on 
punched- card systems (Yates 1993, 49). Concomitantly, the need 
of this “’information- based’ industry” to handle large amounts 
of data continued to rise (Campbell- Kelly 1992, 118). Therefore 
insurance companies were also among the first to purchase the 
newly available computers for civil use, Remington Rand’s Univac 
(1951) and the IBM 650 (1953). Technologically, the IBM 650 was 
less sophisticated than the Univac, but it was compatible with the 
punched- card environment that had proliferated within these 
companies. It presented an “easy migration path” from punched 
cards toward the upcoming computer technologies (Yates 1999, 7). 
It created significantly more demand than the Univac, and by 1955, 
IBM had already taken the lead in computer sales (Yates 1999, 18). 
Thus, throughout the twentieth century, computer technologies 
have permeated offices, factories, and workshops. While they 
persistently widened their area of application— changing organiza-
tional practices one by one, creating new visibilities and possibili-
ties for action— developments in computing were geared toward 
compatibility with the existing technological and organizational 
infrastructure.
Afore I had mentioned that SAP has set and become the standard 
of ERP software. But as research on standards has shown, there 
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to lock into (Star and Lampland 2009, 16). It has to be backward 
compatible with prevailing standards— be they technical or 
institutional standards. In the case of SAP, the story goes like this: 
the company’s first customer, a fiber plant of Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI) located in Östringen, Germany, had commissioned 
a “Material Information and Accounting System.” However, the 
SAP founders and computer scientists Dietmar Hopp and Hasso 
Plattner knew next to nothing about material management and 
accounting. They needed to tap into this existing field of practice. 
To do so, they first managed to hire the economist Claus Wellen-
reuther, also a former IBM colleague, holding a degree in business 
administration. In this early stage of the company, his expertise on 
the standards of business administration was indispensable. Hopp 
says in retrospect that he would not have started the enterprise 
without him (Siegele and Zepelin 2009, 47). Second, to comprehend 
the existing standards of business that the new software would 
have to take up, they undertook something akin to an ethnographic 
exploration of its first customer. “They started in the middle of 
the daily practice. Day after day the young entrepreneurs of SAP 
talked with ICI employees in order to understand how the fiber 
plant was pulsing and ticking and what it held together” (52). They 
studied the very concrete procedures of business administration 
and accounting in great detail. These insights were then translated 
into the slowly evolving software package. Thus the SAP standard 
software incorporated preceding practices of doing business, 
such as established procedures, classifications, and norms. It did 
not start from zero but inserted itself into an existing structure 
by making sure that it was compatible with it (Star and Bowker 
2002; Pollock, Williams, and D’Adderio 2007). Today SAP is said 
to be “tightly anchored in the Old Economy”— in the structures of 
the nineteenth- and twentieth- century corporations (Siegele and 
Zepelin 2009, 90).
But the SAP standard software not only incorporates existing ways 
of doing business; it also incorporates the existing geopolitical 
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ing it through supranational governance. This aspect of being 
postnational is said to have been SAP’s main advantage over other 
ERP software packages in the 1980s, and it is said to relate to its 
European origin. This simply means that the software was built 
in an environment where operating across national borders was 
promoted and facilitated by supranational regulation. Early on, 
SAP developed different country- specific versions (Mormann 2016, 
81). Thus the software was made to display and to switch between 
different languages, currencies, measuring units, and county- 
specific fiscal and legal norms (70). In an interview in 1997, Plattner 
explains that SAP allows to handle different currencies, and 
moreover, it allows to deal with two currencies in one country: the 
new common currency, the euro, will run “on top, in parallel.” Sup-
posedly, this is “a complexity the American software doesn’t handle 
well” (Plattner, cited in Mormann 2016, 72). SAP’s continuous 
dissemination in the world of big business seems to be crucially 
related to its compatibility with transactions across nation- states. 
The software does not clash with national particularities such as 
language, currency, metrics, and legal norms. Quite the opposite, it 
serves as an adaptor between these national standards.
ERP software and especially SAP’s market- dominating products R/2 
and R/3 have profoundly reconfigured the way global businesses 
run. Nonetheless, as this section has aimed to show, ERP software 
itself is organized by various long- standing institutions, practices, 
conventions, rules, and so on. It has been construed in a way to fit 
the well- trodden paths of business and administration. It is socially, 
practically, and materially backward compatible.
Today press and politics do not talk about cybernetics anymore. 
Instead, the magic word is digitization. It marks the contemporary 
sentiment of living in a new period of techno- organization— the 
impression of experiencing a profound change in the way sociality 
is organized. Media scholars Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter are 
among the first to take seriously the reorganization of sociality 
through so- called new media since the 2000s. They start from 
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ing profound effects on the way we live and work. “Organized 
Networks”— the term Rossiter (2006, 23) chooses to describe a 
new technological and social mode of organizing— “institute new 
modes of networked sociality.” “That much is obvious,” he resumes 
(43), but what is neglected is the way previous institutional forms, 
such as the nation- state or the business firm, continue “to play a 
substantive role” (43). He considers digital media technologies as 
situated within specific geopolitical, social, and economic contexts. 
Their technical standards are “shaped by economic and political 
interests,” and patterns of stratification are preserved through an 
“uneven geography of information flows” (35– 36). Digital media 
technologies are entangled with institutions such as property 
rights, the (supra- )national provision of infrastructure, or “alpha 
males scheming in the back rooms” (36). Hence digital networks 
do not unfold on a blank page but rather enter and emerge from 
a field populated with structures, institutions, conventions, and pat-
terns of behavior. Media organize, that much is obvious, but they, 
in turn, are organized by certain social structures. In a similar vein, 
Geert Lovink (2012, 1) claims that “business interests from both the 
Old and New Economy, in close harmony with governments and 
the ‘moral majority’ will do whatever they can to limit the potentials 
of new media.” Thus, according to Lovink, the organizing potential 
of new media is impaired by existing accumulations of power and 
agency and the interest to preserve them.
Hence media organize. But media are not universal, uniform, or  
given (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001, 131). They emerge from other 
media and their respective institutions. In a way, they are inter-
locked with and held back by preceding media, institutions, and 
their practices. Media are not just effectors of organization— of 
a certain mode of perceiving, interacting, attributing, processing, 
and so on— but media are inserted within a context that organizes 
them. This context is made up of powerful structures and the 
struggles over them; of institutions established decades and cen- 
turies ago; and of lifestyles, stocks of knowledge, habitus, and 
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are organized by the patterns and features of the places they are 
emerging from (Larkin 2004). These features and patterns are, 
for instance, subterrestrial power transmission grids, an adminis-
tration running on punched cards, or a national currency. Media 
organize, but media are not of a piece, whole and monolithic. They 
are intermeshed with the context from which they emerge and in 
which they exist.
The Good Organization
Eventually, there is a normative aspect to the relation between 
media and organization, even if (or just because) this kind of 
normativity is often sidelined in media theory, or itself seen as 
entangled with mediatic conditions. Media organize and media are 
organized, but what does it mean for them to be well organized? 
What would constitute a “good organization”?10 And how is this 
idea of the good organization (of the internet, or a company, or a 
community) influenced by the existing constellation of technologies 
and institutions? In the following section, I sketch some of the ways 
this notion has been and could be pursued.
To approach the thorny issue of what is good or desirable, the 
early thinkers of organizational media studies, Harold Innis and 
Marshall McLuhan, can be consulted once again. With regard to 
the development of the Canadian economy, Innis (1950, 3) says, 
“Each staple in its turn left its stamp, and the shift to new staples 
invariably produced periods of crises in which adjustments in the 
old structure were painfully made, and a new pattern created in 
relation to a new staple.” However, Innis displays a “deep- founded 
and ongoing skepticism about markets as a universal mechanism 
of well- being” (Drache 1995, li). Instead, he advocates “to study 
actual economic life” (xix), and he explicitly calls for state interven-
tion to preserve “long- term stability and economic security” (li). 
Hence, with a new organizing mechanism, adjustments in the old 
structure have to be painfully made, but Innis sees it as the task 
of governance to mitigate the painfulness. McLuhan’s surprisingly 
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ogist John Z. Young with the statement that “great changes in ways 
of ordinary human speaking and acting are bound up with the 
adoption of new instruments,” McLuhan ([1962] 2002, 6) grumbles, 
“Had we meditated on such a basic fact as that long ago, we might 
easily have mastered the nature and effects of all our technologies, 
instead of being pushed around by them.” Hence McLuhan deems 
it possible to master technologies rather than just being exposed 
to their effects, but it demands great efforts at the cultivation of 
“critical habits of mind” (Pooley 2016). Therefore, resting on the 
classic theme of critical theory, the good organization by and of 
media should not be left to market mechanisms alone.
Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter argue for “a passionate pragmatism 
to define and shape the architecture of new media” (Lovink 2012, 
1). Lovink reflects on this move “into practicality” as follows: having 
practiced “postmodern metaphysics, ‘deep irrelevance’ European 
style,” himself for years, he started to miss acting toward a political 
framework. “I experienced a lack of strategy amongst cultural 
critics who were unable to effectively do something against the 
hegemony of global neo- liberalism” (4). Underpinning this, the first 
sentence of Rossiter’s book reads, “There is an urgent need for new 
institutional forms.” According to him, encompassing computer 
networks have produced “uncertainties of labour and life” that are 
exposing “the limits of prevailing institutional systems” (Rossiter 
2006, 13). Reminding of Innis, he claims that to “recompose labour 
and life in ways that furnish a sense of security and stability,” it 
is necessary to organize the new sociotechnical configurations, 
meaning to make an intervention and to “attend to the task of 
governance” (17).
What does it mean to attend to the task of governance? In the 
afterword of their recent publication Organization after Social Media 
(and echoed in the afterword of this volume), Rossiter and Lovink 
lament the lack of organizedness among the Left manifested by 
its exceptional “downward trajectory.” They ask, “How has populist 
politics organized as movements, while the radical left seems as 
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with the current social media condition?” To them, attending to 
the task of governance— or at least articulating one’s voice with 
regard to governance— seems to be related to finding a form that 
corresponds to the technological environment. One example for 
this correspondence they give is the “umbrella movement” sparking 
in Hong Kong in 2014. Using an off- the- grid Bluetooth network 
(FireChat), the protesters were able to communicate among 
each other— and to organize themselves— without having been 
dependent on an internet connection and without having fueled 
the police’s database. Such a distributed media practice troubles 
the centralizing, aggregating, and correlating use of network media 
by those in power while still making use of networks. Also, Lovink 
and Rossiter (2018, 3) suggest that strong ties and long commit-
ments are needed in a technoculture that works precisely against 
them. But how can this be achieved— “the organization of passions 
that endure”? What are networks organized in a way that they are 
capable of making decisions, taking action, and making a long- term 
difference? Does an answer lie with think tank like “secret societ-
ies”? If the internet actually resembles a schoolyard where people 
hang out, chat, and harass each other, then a way to balance these 
tendencies could indeed be more organization as we learned it 
from clubs, associations, unions, or bureaucracy.
Last, and thus coming back to the beginning, what does the 
wobbly question of “the good organization” mean for the case of 
ERP software? How do the “adjustments painfully made” manifest 
themselves? How could they be eased for the sake of “security 
and stability”? What comes to mind are the frequent stories of SAP 
introductions not turning out as intended (e.g., Westelius 2006; 
Ciborra 2000). This means the implementation of the software 
package leads to significant organizational chaos, in extreme 
cases causing temporary shutdowns or even the cancellation of 
the implementation project. The most recent story comes from 
the German discount grocer Lidl. In July 2018, Lidl stopped the 
introduction of SAP HANA/Retail after seven years of development 
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this development was the well- known conflict between software 
customization, on one hand, and organizational reengineering, on 
the other hand. SAP offers a standard software that works best if 
the company adapts its processes to the software. Customizing the 
software so as to accommodate a company’s existing processes 
makes it more complex, more expensive, less stable, and less reli-
able. The latter is said to have happened to Lidl. It commissioned 
wide- ranging changes to the software unprepared to transform its 
own structures. In the end, the software was not performing well, 
while the costs continued to rise (Kolf and Kerkmann 2018).
Extensively covered by industrial sociology, there are also stories 
of individual employment biographies being disrupted by new 
technologies and the competences it demands, or rather, the 
competences it renders obsolete. In this sense, a new ERP software 
terminates preceding and often well- established actor- networks. 
For instance, Becker, Vering, and Winkelmann (2007, 202) report 
on certain sectors running entirely on systems without graphical 
user interface, hence they are handled only via keyboard. In 
interaction with these systems, the employees had learned to work 
“blindly,” meaning they relied on the beeps and thereby achieved 
high speed. With a new system, such a skill becomes worthless. In 
situations like these, and depending on their age, employees prefer 
(or are encouraged) to leave their jobs instead of acquiring the 
skills necessary for the new generation of software. This is certainly 
also a fear the interviewee Mrs. J. had when the introduction of SAP 
was announced. But she took on the self- understanding of being 
an eager and lifelong learner. Something new again, but it will be 
feasible. When I talked to her two years later, she was in full control 
of the SAP system. Even more, she realized that the system would 
produce “total chaos” if she did not correct it constantly. These 
corrections were based on her experiential knowledge of working 
at company N. for twenty years. Thus, in adjusting the system, she 
continued to be valuable to the company.
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How do media and organization relate to each other? In this text, I 
gathered arguments from media studies, organization studies, and 
neighboring streams of research and complemented them with 
the case of business software, an exemplary case of gray media. In 
doing so, three ways of drafting the relation between media and 
organization appeared. The first one bears upon the proposition 
that “media organize” (Martin 2003), and it explores media in terms 
of their organizing capacities. The second line of inquiry compli-
cated the first one by pointing to the organizedness of media. It 
revolves around media’s entanglement with institutional cultures 
and broader technological environments. Last, a normative 
question arose: media organize and media are organized, but what 
does it mean for them to be organized well? I outlined some of the 
research efforts addressing this question.
In September 2018, the founding conference of the Munich Center 
for Emancipatory Technology Studies took place. Speakers from 
science, politics, unions, and civil society investigate ways of 
governing technology that aim at “good jobs, lived democracy, a 
self- governed life and ecological sustainability” (Zentrum emanzipa-
torische Technikforschung 2018). At this point, the ghost of Kittler 
could be summoned to undermine all efforts of realizing a good 
organization of media based on thoroughly understanding their na-
ture and their effects. “Understanding media,” Kittler (1999, xl) has 
written, “remains an impossibility precisely because the dominant 
information technologies of the day control all understanding and 
its illusions.” But then again, why not summon another authority in 
response encouraging us to attempt “the art of not being gov-
erned quite so much” (Foucault 2007, 45)?
Notes
 1 It was part of fieldwork I conducted at the medium- sized metalworking busi-
ness N. between 2012 and 2015. Publications based on this fieldwork are 
Conrad (2017, forthcoming- a, forthcoming- b).
 2 Siegele and Zeppelin quote from Werner Sombart’s “Der moderne Kapitalis-
83mus”: “One plainly cannot think capitalism without double- entry bookkeeping: 
they relate to each other like form and content” (Sombart [1917] 2012, 118, 
translation by the author).
 3 This calls for a definition of organizing: What kinds of actions does this term 
refer to? What is not- organizing? I am not sure there is a satisfying answer to 
this. In organization studies, to talk of organizing instead of organization(s) 
implies being part of the process philosophy school of thought that criticizes 
the discipline’s occupation with organizations as entities. Representatives say 
that “to organize is a process, whether it is a matter of fixing a door, writing a 
letter or restructuring a large corporation. It does not really matter in terms 
of analysis whether we fix a door or restructure a corporation” (Hernes 2008, 
xvi– xvii). Today organization studies is a thoroughly interdisciplinary field 
without a consensus about its area of competence. Scholars deal with a barely 
sortable range of phenomena and concepts (cf. Hernes 2008, 147– 48). On the 
undisciplined, creole, pidgin, and bazaar- ish character of organization studies, 
see also Czarniawska (2003) and Beyes (2007).
 4 “Humble tools,” or gray media, are also addressed in Joanne Yates’s research 
in business history. She attributes a crucial role to them: “From the U.S. Postal 
Service to typewriters, vertical files, and adding machines, technologies and 
techniques of information gathering, storage, manipulation, and communica-
tion have figured prominently in the evolution of firms and business practices” 
(Yates 2005, 1).
 5 These tools can be shiny and innovative or ordinary, unremarkable, and infra-
structural. This depends on the degree of newness ascribed to them and the 
degree of familiarity acquired with regard to them (Edwards 2003, 185).
 6 In this phase, Innis conducted what has later been called “dirt research”: in 
a kayak, he traveled the country westward along the continent’s interlocking 
lake and river systems and gathered all kinds of information related to staple 
production (cf. Creighton 1957, 49– 60; Rossiter 2012).
 7 Today an understanding of landscape as material power can also be found in 
cultural geography, for instance, in Mitchell’s (2002) Landscape and Power.
 8 In this chapter, Wiener basically describes the possibility of teleportation. Be-
cause he assumes a human being (an individuality) to be constituted by certain 
patterns of information (generated through past development and continued 
development along these lines), he deduces that “there is no absolute distinc-
tion between the types of transmission which we can use for sending a tele-
gram from country to country and the types of transmission which at least are 
theoretically possible for transmitting a living organism such as a human being” 
(Wiener [1950] 1989, 103).
 9 Herman Hollerith’s Tabulating Machine Company (1896) merged into the Inter-
national Business Machines Corporation (IBM) in 1924.
10 “The Good Organization” was the general theme of the 2017 colloquium of 
the European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS). It revolved around the 
notion that organization could be “a force for the greater good, public as well 
as private,” while being reflexive about the history and normativity of this idea.
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Afterword
Propositions	on	the	
Organizational Form
Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter
Media and Organization
The quest of organization haunts us. If anarchists were once said 
to defy authority, nowadays we defy organization. Structures are 
perceived to hold us back and pin us down with the iron cage of 
identity. The solidified social limits our freedom with its demand 
of never- ending “engagement.” How desperate is it to live your 
life as an insulated rebel without a cause? Instead, we should ask, 
what is pure organization? Is there a new core that we could define 
and design? What’s commitment outside of today’s technosocial 
conventions? Are there bonds that create ties, unhinged from pro-
cedure, unfettered by bureaucracy? Is there a form of conspiracy 
that operates without all the tiresome preparations? Mutual aid 
and local self- organization come to mind, but what if we’re forced 
to pursue organization of the unorganizables? Does a self- evident 
General Will exist that does not need to be discussed and exhaus-
tively questioned? Having arrived at this point, we can clearly see 
the romantic undertone of the Critique of Organization. What’s a 
lean revolution, an effortless regime change? Can we presuppose 
a hive mind that performs like an automaton? Humans, coming 
together, create the Event, simply because of an inner urge to 
experience relations without guarantees.
90 What does organization mean in a culture of shrinking commit-
ment? Nowadays, the decision to commit is one made after a cost– 
benefit analysis. Options are kept alive as possibilities of transac-
tions with higher returns. Everyday life, as Randy Martin (2002) so 
insightfully analyzed, is infused with financialization. Intimacy now 
bears the cold face of nihilism. Once life is unburdened of fixed 
dates and routine tasks, the horizon of choice fuels the desire to 
defer any obligation. This is the logical extension of post- Fordist 
labor regimes predicated on flexibility without a future. A social 
desert blooms in the techno-abyss of weak ties.
What are the prevailing forces, conditions, and events that 
galvanize organization, as distinct from disorganization, entropy, 
indifference, flexibilization, or outbursts without an agenda? 
Reinhold Martin’s concept “media organize” is a key injunction in 
this book on organization. For Martin, media are defined by their 
organizational function: media organize. At the core of this thesis 
is the production of order that generates patterns and relations. 
Constituted through material properties and the partitioning work 
of form, the order of media is a way of distinguishing different 
organizational dynamics and forces. Similarly, organizational 
tendencies, practices, and capacities become a way to define  
media and distinguish one medium from another. Organization 
is coupled with form. The question of organization for us has, 
for many years, been key to political design within a world of 
persistent crisis, struggle, even chaos. What governs in a world in 
which the ordering work of government is in near- total disrepute?
The Cambridge Analytica controversy of early 2018 prompts us to 
ask, first, whether geopolitical forces condition or organize media 
to organize. Cambridge Analytica– Facebook very deliberately 
decided to touch down in the United States as the primary test- 
bed; the rest of the world was not so relevant. They are part of the 
larger FANG “plat- formatting” of economy and society (Mackenzie 
and Munster 2019), along with TenCent, Baidu, and the Chinese lo-
gistical media juggernaut. In this regard, media do indeed organize. 
However, it is not really possible to return to the media format as 
91we have known it during the era of broadcast communications. Is 
the platform itself the core of the problem or part of the solution? 
There is a post- Hegelian dilemma here: what comes after the 
synthesis? Usually implosion and collapse. No apotheosis. What are 
the counterforces that can challenge the platform? The federation 
of decentralized platforms? Post-platform— is that all there is? It 
might be premature to answer these questions. It’s early days for 
the platform as form.
In the wake of Cambridge Analytica– Facebook, we find ourselves 
asking what’s organization after social media? We can trawl 
through the Marx– Bakunin– Lenin debates, even read them on 
repeat mode in the “Jodi Dean” retro style that wants to make the 
American Communist Party Great Again, but there is no point in re-
cuperating the worn- out organs of the party. Another option is the 
party– movement hybrid, a party of parties, a federation of political 
entities, which was extensively discussed in the context of Syriza, 
Podemos, and DiEM25, each an initiative that came out of the 
2011 uprisings. A leap- frogging of technomodernity happened 
when enough noise gathered around the squares, from the Arab 
Spring, via WikiLeaks and Anonymous, to Black Lives Matter and 
#MeToo, which makes one think that yes, maybe social media do 
indeed organize. But organize what? Those “early” years, not even a 
decade ago, situated organization as a media event that facilitates 
consciousness raising and acts as a tool for pressure groups and 
lobbyists to turn the party into something with social momentum. 
But the revolution never happened. And it never will. The scale 
of crisis has shown that no amount of coalition building among 
nations will fix the living hell of the future- present. The corporate- 
run nation- state does not offer any solutions either. This is why so 
much of the political energy these days is focused on the municipal 
level, including city- to- city networks (Caccia 2016).
Let’s hear more about the Protestant colleges before they became 
absorbed into the military– industrial– educational complex. And 
what about Norman Foster’s new Apple campus in Cupertino, 
California? How has that complex devoted energies and decision- 
92 making to transform the organizational logic and production of 
knowledge and subjectivity? Will it be an organizational model 
rolled out elsewhere across the world, like the glass- and- steel 
skyscrapers were in the twentieth century? We fully agree that 
architecture mediates and organizes the world to which it refers. 
What would happen if we were to run architecture- as- media 
alongside networks- as- organization? Architecture as a complex of 
social relations, infrastructural capacities, engineering standards, 
and aesthetic styles distinguished the mode of organization in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This set of protocols has not 
gone away but is now complemented by architecture as a com-
putational parameter in the modeling of algorithmic governance 
tasked with prediction and preemption coupled with the extraction 
and amplified abstraction of data from the toils of labor and the 
social production of value.
If we are to think organization in relation to networks (power 
laws, scale- free networks, weak ties vs. strong ties), then our 
focus might be directed toward post-platform media— what are 
the media of organized networks defined by strong ties, and what 
is it about their properties that engenders particular organiza-
tional tendencies? Indeed, do media matter within postdigital 
conditions when environment is increasingly understood as the 
background mediating system through which communication 
is signaled and relations are forged? Environment organizes as 
media slip away.
Inevitable	Incorporations
Recent decades are defined by a complete upending of modern 
models of organization. Indeed, there has been a breakdown of 
traditional organizations. Political activists, movements, and theo-
rists (from cybernetics to post-humanism) are dogged by disorgani-
zation as the dominant condition. The entrepreneurial monopolies 
don’t mind this at all. They work out how to siphon data and wash 
it with a magic wand that spits out value.
93How to understand organization in times of neoliberal clouds, 
personalized networks, and advanced forms of non-commitment? 
The performance and management of work are, in fact, highly 
organized, yet require of workers some sort of antiwork attitude. 
Tasks are not just routines. Sure, there is TaskRabbit, and there’s 
no doubt that freelancers find a routine in the struggle to make 
some coin. But, like Amazon Mechanical Turk, the key task here is 
to ensure that the human is no longer distinct from the machine. 
Traditionally, routines would vary over the course of the day 
or change in season. By contrast, the task of the machine is to 
never end, just keep chugging along and, ideally, accelerating as 
time elapses.
Universities are heading in the same direction, where much that 
used to be understood as Bildung is now an exercise in automation. 
As Stefano Harney notes, in the algorithmic institution, “most 
managers have already been replaced by machines. They are just 
too dumb to know it” (Schapira and Montgomery 2017). According 
to Harney,
the consultant is nothing more than a demonstration of 
access. He or she can show up in your workplace and 
open it up in ways you thought were protected, solid. 
His presence is proof that you are now newly accessi-
ble. No one needs to listen to a consultant. He is just a 
talking algorithm anyway. But he has made his point by 
showing up.
Organization needs to exit the innocence of immanent planes, 
endless assemblages, and the allocation of distinct tasks and 
management of issues. Organization also offers us a parallel world 
to the constant highs and lows of our not so private lives and states 
of mind. The managerial discourse of fluidity is rampant across 
institutional settings within advanced economies and defines the 
culture of organization disconnected from the world to which it re-
fers. There is no backup plan for the unbearable lightness of com-
mitment. Organization within conditions of contemporary media 
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and apps that shape perception and cognition. What happens 
when contract workers walk away from the job but categorically 
deny they are on strike? Why does such a profound depoliticiza-
tion encapsulate such acts of refusal? How has this come to be 
understood as another lifestyle option rather than some collective 
instantiation of shared experience that demands revolt? The end 
of the contract is not internalized as the humility of being fired; 
rather, dignity upholds the narrative of legitimate existence within 
a managerial paradigm that work, similar to life, has a beginning, 
middle, and end. As much as vulnerability is a common condition, 
it cannot be named as such because it violates the self- invested 
code of liberty that props up portfolio careers. Atomization is one 
of the core problems for organization within situations defined by 
platform participation.
Herein lies the predicament. If you are not the cool kid hooked on 
the delusion of entrepreneurial self- invention, where are you other 
than cast adrift, gravitating toward the ugly sentiments of populist 
politics that define the alt- right and similar formations? How has 
populist politics organized as movements, while the radical Left 
seems as incapable as ever to crystalize a collective imaginary that 
is in sync with the current social media condition? How to get rid of 
all these real existing resentments? How can alt- right be sabotaged 
and denied access to the collective unconscious of today’s potential 
rebel forces? Fast updating, ever- changing timelines, snappy and 
dark comment culture— this is the grammar of media that is not 
about having dialogues, debating issues, or sharing material but 
rather dominated by motives such as trawling, shitstorm, anger, 
aggression, frustration, and despair. These are the core elements 
of the social media condition. Habermas’s idealized public sphere 
is nowhere to be found in this environment of terminated futures. 
Alt- right is not at all marginal (and faces its own organizational 
problems) but in fact occupies the space of the new norm. The 
access to power through Breitbart and similar platforms is, these 
days, very different from the logic of representational media that 
95mirrored the old corridors of power with its think tanks, consul-
tants, lobby groups, and political parties. The networked media 
of platforms that attract and then agglomerate social disaffection 
are able to mainline the people to the figureheads of power. This 
is why Trump, for instance, has been able to maintain such high 
approval ratings despite the disoriented Left in the United States 
puzzling over their failure to extend the path to glory.
Think Tank Theory
How can we imagine doing radical research outside of the estab-
lished academic institutions and large mainstream media? Is this 
possible anyway? Social movements have always undertaken their 
own research, comparable to political parties and their “scientific 
offices.” These days, NGOs produce tons of reports. Up until the 
1990s, this work was imagined as an intellectual practice allocated 
deep inside the social movements themselves. The work mostly 
comprised investigative journalism, activist research into corpo-
rations, mapping extreme- right- wing networks and organizations, 
nuclear energy deals, and related lobby campaigns of multination-
als that supported the apartheid regime in South Africa. This type 
of “indy research” was done to inform the movements themselves 
and provide them with info- ammunition in the fight for the hearts 
and minds of the people (sometimes confused by many with “pub-
lic opinion”).
If we consider Amsterdam in the 1980s, we find a blossoming of 
research undertaken by groups of the nonaligned. There were 
separate autonomous research collectives that monitored racists 
and neofascists (FOK), a group that followed police and secret 
service activities (Jansen & Jansen), an outfit that investigated 
speculation and gentrification in the city (SPOK), and even a theory 
and humanities arm of the squatters movement (ADILKNO/Agentur 
Bilwet). In some instances, the groups were linked to specific ar- 
chives or magazines, as was the case with radical feminism. The 
last thing these research collectives wanted to do was to produce 
dull policy papers.
96 None of these groups used the corporate term think tank or scientif-
ic bureau (attached to a political party), even though that’s arguably 
what they were. Perhaps it was enough to be in a collective? But 
in these terms, there is no explicit connection with thinking. The 
pondering time of thinking didn’t seem to be very sexy (that was 
something associated with the sequestered and therefore apolitical 
work of scholars); neither was collective research considered to be 
situating your group inside a tank. But, then, why call yourself a 
foundation (a legal term, controlled by lawyers and notaries), or an 
institute, for that matter, the very symbol of one’s desire to be part 
of official reality and its “institutionalization”? NGOs were also on 
the radar back then, although they were associated with the United 
Nations and de facto ministries of the state. Often enough, their 
“non” was, and still is, a farce.
Over the past decade, the Better Think Tank Project (BTTP) of 
the Munich art duo Ralf Homann and Manuela Unverdorben has 
looked at the issue of think tanks from an artistic perspective. 
The duo investigates the politics and aesthetics of think tanks as 
a dominant form of knowledge production. What’s the appeal 
of the motor behind the current innovation madness? Are think 
tanks deadly boring? What do we gain from a copy- and- paste of 
these kind of forms other than mimicking their sociospatial culture 
(such as “the office”)? We asked the duo why there aren’t any leftist 
think tanks (Lovink 2018): “When the entrepreneur Anthony Fisher 
wanted to use his fortune to influence British politics and asked 
Friedrich von Hayek which party to support, he got the hint not to 
waste time and gain instead decisive influence in the battle of ideas 
by funding research in structural forms like think tanks. Think tanks 
are a better tool to persist the myth of an objective truth.”
Their responses are worth reading at length: “It’s a common 
misunderstanding that think tanks are actually creative units, 
let alone were established with this intention. Think tanks label 
themselves ‘independent’ but still push their backer’s agenda and 
accomplish credibility by pretending to be neutral and to conduct 
serious research. However, instead of actual academic research 
97they operate as echo chambers, multiplicators of the neoliberal 
ideological agenda. There is no real eagerness in thinking up new 
ideas, because they already possess the ‘truth.’ Instead, they aim 
to influence public opinion, to intervene in policy- making and to 
spread their program.”
The Munich simulation duo are all fired up: “To dance at the 
Capitalist Ball is a lot of fun! But be beware of misunderstandings. 
If it should happen that the think tank dress code would change 
to hoodies then we also would reflect on that. Still, we watch the 
developments in the NGO field critically, especially when NGOs are 
acting as think tanks. Progressive movements should be based on 
solidarity and organizational forms of solidarity.”
Since 2005, we have been working together on the idea of “orga-
nized networks.” Recently, we brought together our writings in a 
book called Organization after Social Media (2018). Radical think tank 
theory can be considered a contribution to this project, albeit from 
the opposite direction, as think tanks are usually allocated to the 
space of bricks and mortar. Organized networks, by contrast, are 
tight virtual networks, defined by their “strong ties,” with dispersed 
contributors that do without expensive office spaces. However, 
what organized networks and think tanks have in common is a com-
mitment to be there for the long haul. Such a proposal is anathema 
to the brave “orgnet” comrades condemned to spend their days in 
coworking spaces, in cafés, and at home at the kitchen table. How 
did we end up in such a neoliberal trap? How can we transform that 
temporary precarious work into a long- term sustainable project 
without falling into the NGO predicament? We urgently need new 
forms and cultural imaginaries to conspire. One of the many ways 
to get there is through the deconstruction of hegemonic formats. 
How can we envision the radical or post– think tank as a form?
Writing from Milan via email, Alex Foti (pers. comm., May 10, 2018) 
reports on his latest initiative to set up a think tank and explains his 
motivation to use this particular term and organizational format. 
“Nick Srnicek and others highlighted the role of the Mont Pelerin 
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means of think tanking. While we cannot forego an analysis of the 
revolutionary subject, which in my opinion is the precariat, it is true 
that all forms of the Left are at a historical low (certainly in Europe). 
We need an intellectual strategy to rebuild values and ideology 
and wage successful battles against oligopolistic capital and win 
the mortal combat with nazi- populism from Washington to Ankara. 
Closer to our Milanese reality, we are witnessing a conservative 
return to old Marxist– Leninist certainties even among young 
sections of the movement, and a concomitant renewed emphasis 
on work and the working class at the expense of universal basic 
income and the polygendered, multiethnic precariat. The idea is 
to merge the intellectual curiosity of today’s student movement 
with cognitarians from previous waves of protest (2001 and 2010 
in Italy). The name of our think tank is still tentative as we have 
only gathered informally, but I like best ALIEN INTELLIGENCE: The 
Post- capitalist Exoplanet.”
Whether think tanks are the most strategic radical form to chime 
with our times remains to be seen. We need examples to bounce 
around our ideas and concepts. Hit- and- run actions that result 
in loose coalitions falling apart once the event is over should no 
longer be encouraged, if not straight out rejected. Think tanks are 
worth exploring and experimenting with to see whether a leftist 
politics can be designed within what historically has been an alien 
machine. Put bluntly, the downward trajectory of the Left has 
reached a point where there is no option: invent new organiza-
tional and institutional forms or inhabit and remake existing ones. 
Unless the Left gets serious about this, it will only further consign 
itself to irrelevance as the planet endures prolonged crisis.
Sovereign Media and the  
Organization	of	Emptiness
The current economy of sharing and the business of data extractiv-
ism are the key techniques of contemporary platform capitalism 
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media and organization. Lacking nuance and bound to the logic 
of expropriation, the narrow spectrum of platform capitalism is 
less about dominant social media networks than it is about the 
total lack of sovereignty, dignity, and empathy as a mentality, 
self- image, and survival tactic to overcome technonihilism and its 
unconscious maneuvers that steer and capture the online self. 
There’s something rich and intriguing about standing up and taking 
back one’s information destiny. This is what we call sovereign media, 
a declaration and act of creating autonomous data and network 
infrastructures. Such interventions go beyond occasional radical 
gestures and the spectacle of the event.
Sovereign media configure territory and power in a world thor-
oughly enmeshed with media systems and technological agents. 
The underlying technics of media platforms also bear upon the 
production of subjectivity, organizing perception, cognition, and 
sociality in ways that unsettle and reorient modern understandings 
of the primary organizational forms that govern labor and life 
(the church, state, firm, union). But this unsettling of dominant 
organizational forms is also a productive process. “Organization 
is the central and basic material element of the constitution of 
the subject” (Negri 2005, 147). There’s a latent formalist tendency 
within the dictum “media organize.” Let us not forget that media 
also organize subjects, and the struggle that underpins such a 
process is the work of politics and the political.
As negative technologies without a megaphone, sovereign media 
disappear into the sea of noise. They are subtractive machines, 
clawing back “data assets” from centers of control. A great example 
here is the use of off- the- grid Bluetooth networks as the primary 
technique of organization for the umbrella movement in Hong 
Kong. This distributed mode of communication during the 2014 
occupation and summer of skirmishes ensured the absence of 
a centralized archive for the surveillance machine of authorities. 
Denied the capacity to correlate information and generate a data 
universe of the movement, authorities instead had to infiltrate 
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personas of rebels with a cause. Such instances in which total 
knowledge is disabled as a result of distributed forms of commu-
nication also register an epistemological crisis. This is the crisis of 
neopositivism, which has undergone a resurgence over the past 
decade as new quantitative techniques have emerged with the 
advent of big data analytics. Long weary of the critical lessons of 
post-structuralism, the humanities and social sciences have em-
braced neopositivism to legitimize claims of knowledge. Not only, 
then, does the mode of communication adopted by the umbrella 
movement instruct us about how to organize in strategic ways that 
trouble, if not undermine, contemporary techniques of policing, 
but it also signals a more substantive crisis that pertains to how 
the world is known, how subjects are produced, and, subsequently, 
how politics is organized.
In asking the question how media organize politics and subjec-
tivity, we must take care not to be distracted by the seduction of 
reproduction. To do so would be a fatal political and conceptual 
mistake. What is clear from the history of movements is the medi-
um specificity of their emergence. Whether it is pamphlets or fax 
machines, videos or mobile phones, Twitter or Facebook, political 
organization is always technological but also social and historical. 
The audacity of insurrection is made possible by media of organiza-
tion tied to the organization of passions that endure.
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Afterword by Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter
Digital media technologies re-pose the ques-
tion of organization—and thus of power and 
domination, control and surveillance, disrup-
tion and emancipation. This book interrogates 
organization as effect and condition of media. 
How can we understand the recursive relation-
ship between media and organization? How 
can we think, explore, critique—and perhaps 
alter—the organizational bodies and scripts 
that shape contemporary life?
“Organize encourages us to think about media as a noun and a 
verb. The media mediates as an apparatus for organizing people 
and things, patterning actual and possible relations. Connecting 
media theory with organization theory, this book deserves to be 
widely read.” — Martin Parker, University of Bristol
“This volume assembles some of the very thinkers who track the 
terms ‘media’ and ‘organization’—how they migrate, cross paths, 
and even double each other in digital cultures.” 
— Keller Easterling, Yale University
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